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FOREWORD
National ammunition standards help regulate a State’s ammunition and explo-
sives-related processes, operations and activities, procedures and the people 
involved, thereby enhancing the safety and security of ammunition stocks for all 
those exposed to its risks. Only with national standards in place will it be possible 
to provide safe and functional ammunition thus reducing the risk of diversion or 
an unplanned explosive event. 
The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) provide an important 
resource for national authorities to use as part of establishing and implementing 
national standards. Besides making the process more straightforward, the devel-
opment of national standards based on the IATG provides coherent, tested and 
internationally approved methodologies for a State to use in managing risks from 
their ammunition stockpile, while injecting quality and risk management principles 
into the systems and organizations involved. The IATG’s approach makes a difficult 
process more manageable for a given State and breaks the process into incremental 
steps that can be more easily assessed, prioritized, and managed.
An impediment to date in the use of the IATG towards developing national stockpile 
management standards has been the lack of guidance on how to translate the 
IATG into national standards. This document is intended to help bridge that gap. 
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Figure 1 –  Destroying surplus propellant by burning  
(Source : Ammunition Technical Trade UK)
1.1 AIM OF THIS GUIDE
The guide aims to assist State authorities in the development of national standards 
for ammunition management and towards implementing those standards across 
State institutions. More specifically, it outlines the key considerations and processes 
involved in the development of national standards, and provides advice for the 
development of an organizational framework necessary for an effective, coordinated 
and sustainable national ammunition management system.
Each State is different and will face differing ammunition management challenges. 
With its full extent of more than 1,300 pages, applying the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATG) may first appear overwhelming. To make the IATG more 
accessible for users, this guide summarizes each of the technical modules of the 
IATG and highlights critical issues pertinent to ammunition safety and security, 
which should be covered by national standards. Not all of the IATG topics may be 
relevant for a State. Yet there are several universal issues in ammunition stockpile 
management that will apply in some form to all States. These range from personnel 
training and competence requirements, ammunition surveillance and inspections, 
to risk management protocols and security of stocks, amongst others.
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As well as conforming to existing national legislation and other relevant norms, 
national standards should, at a minimum, adhere to the guiding principles of the 
IATG. They should reflect a State’s policies and provide requirements and guidance 
for ammunition accounting, storage, processing, disposal, security and transport. 1) 
They should protect those at risk from unintended events such as catastrophic 
explosions and fires at munitions sites whilst enabling the prevention and mitigation 
of such events. They should also enhance control over the State’s assets and 
improve security to help minimize the risk of stockpile diversion.
This guide assists those responsible for drafting national regulations, by describing 
an inclusive and coherent methodology for developing standards, and by provid-
ing a simplified approach towards addressing often complex ammunition topics. 
Beyond the IATG volumes and modules, references are made to other guidance 
and resources available, such as the IATG Implementation Support Toolkit, 2) the 
UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Model Regulations, 3) 
and the Ammunition Life-cycle Management Handbook, 4) which may prove useful 
in helping develop new or improve existing standards.
1.2 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IATG AND NATIONAL STANDARDS
The IATG are a compilation of voluntary, practical guidelines on the safe and secure 
management of ammunition. They are meant for States and organizations to use 
in developing national standards, processes and procedures. 5)
The IATG were developed by the United Nations at the request of the General 
Assembly and are overseen by the UN SaferGuard Programme. They were developed 
to be consistent with “good practices” found around the globe, as well as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards and guides. They are 
also complementary to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), Integrated 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) and Modular 
Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), as well as relevant 
international conventions and treaties. 
National standards are issued by a national authority or an organization authorized 
to act on its behalf. It may be appropriate for the national authority to commence 
development of national standards by assigning a strategic body and a legal frame-
work to steer the process, and at a minimum, by appointing a standard issuing 
organization, as described later in this guide. National standards are generally 
considered legally binding documents within a State.
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1.3 STRUCTURED APPROACH TO DEVELOPING NATIONAL STANDARDS
Most industrial sectors have a set of standards to regulate safety, security and 
efficiency of the work they do and to ensure the quality of the products they produce. 
The IATG conform to the recommendations and processes contained within the ISO 
quality management systems (ISO 9001 :2008) and ISO risk management system 
(ISO guide 51). Adopting the ISO format and language has provided significant 
advantages to the IATG, including consistency in its layout, use of internationally 
recognised terminology, and greater acceptance by international, regional and national 
organizations who are accustomed to the ISO series of standards and guides.
Similarly, in developing its national standards, a national authority may take advantage 
of the IATG’s existing ISO language “shall”, “should” and “may” to indicate the level 
of action required, as well as the quality and risk management systems integrated 
within the IATG that can be directly implemented.
Prior to publication of the first version of the IATG in 2011, States went their own way 
in developing national standards, which were often adapted from various regional 
standards and organizational guidelines. This frequently led to national standards 
which were fractured and difficult to implement. With the availability of the IATG, 
a State now has a resource which it can draw from to establish its own, legally 
binding national standards and protocols.
National standards should not just duplicate relevant sections of the IATG, for a number 
of reasons. The needs of a State may not warrant the entire scope offered by all 
of the IATG’s 12 thematic volumes and 45 modules, but instead, a State may find that 
a smaller number of national standards may be sufficient. Therefore, in developing 
national standards, the aim should be to cover the functions, roles and responsibilities 
for each core activity, in a manner that is achievable, measurable and legally defensible. 
Additionally, the IATG provide guidance which should be incorporated into national 
standards, taking into consideration national needs and processes.
When the national authority chooses to apply the IATG to guide the development 
of standards for ammunition stockpile management, challenges associated with 
the implementation of the IATG’s requirements can be better anticipated and thus 
addressed more effectively.
During the first steps in planning national standards, success often depends on 
the level of participation by relevant government bodies, armed forces and other 
State key stakeholders. The best national standards come out of those processes 
that involve all stakeholders, from the authorities at the top to those working at 
the lowest levels. However, it is important to remember that the development of 
national standards is a national responsibility, and external entities should only act 
in an advisory role with final decision-making being made by national authorities.
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1.4   SUPPORTIVE NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK AND  
STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH
Previous experience has shown that the highest levels of success occur if a State 
addresses the development of standards using a step-by-step approach rather 
than tackling the entire process all at once. For example, before standards can be 
developed, a national policy has to be in place that directs the State’s approach 
towards ammunition stockpile management, and that policy could be as simple as 
“utilize the IATG”. Next, competent authorities owning the ammunition stockpile 
management process should be identified. That could then be followed by the 
establishment of a national, organizational framework with assigned roles and 
responsibilities. These organizations would assess national ammunition stockpiles 
against national and strategic requirements and determine what aspects of the 
IATG are relevant and should be applied. They should also establish priorities for 
the application of identified IATG topics and dictate the implementation level, in 
line with the State resources, capacities and capabilities.
First selecting the topics that are more practically attainable, and those that address 
known critical safety and security needs, is a better approach than attempting to 
address all IATG topics at once. It is far better to move forward in this manner, 
as failing early on with an overly-ambitious set of standards may challenge the 
system to a point where officials feel discouraged from trying again. The application 
of the IATG in creating national standards cannot feasibly be accomplished in a 
short time, but should be viewed as a long-term effort, building on an established 
framework consisting of national policy, competent authorities and organizational 
structure. Within this framework, standards are developed and improved gradually 
and incrementally as the national system matures and is capable of absorbing more.
Figure 2 – Example of a national policy framework, roles and responsibilities
Government 
Political decision 
makers 
Strategic  
Minister of Defence
Chief of Defence  
Management of 
defence capability
Resource allocation
Operational
Joint staff
Force command
Planning of
strategic capabilities  
Planning 
Procurement 
Disposal 
National defence and 
security policies Planning 
 
Planning 
Procurement
Stockpile management
Disposal
Routine 
management
Tactical
Unit commanders
Mid-ranking officers
 Stockpile management
Disposal
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1.5  WHY EFFECTIVE AMMUNITION STOCKPILE  
MANAGEMENT IS NECESSARY
Stockpile management is an important national responsibility and the most effective 
mechanism for optimizing safety in storage, and reducing the risk of ammunition 
diversion through loss, theft, fraud or illicit trade.
Stockpile management is as much about developing appropriate procedures, pro-
cesses and systems as it is about storage and security infrastructure. Infrastructure 
is expensive, but significant improvements in safety and security can be made at 
minimal costs, through system and process improvements. Changes of attitude and 
the development of an ethos of explosive safety can have a major impact on reducing 
the current high global level of undesirable explosion events within ammunition 
storage areas. A similar approach to the security of ammunition stockpiles would 
make a major contribution to reducing the risk of diversion and onward proliferation.
There are many examples of the consequences of ammunition and explosives that 
have deteriorated or become damaged due to inadequate attention to storage, 
handling and movement. The Geneva-based Small Arms Survey has recorded more 
than 600 unplanned explosions at munitions sites since 1979. 6) Four different 
examples of unplanned explosion events are shown below. These could have 
been prevented or their effects could have been significantly reduced through risk 
mitigation activities carried out as part of the implementation of national standards 
for ammunition management.
• On the evening of 27 January 2002, an accidental detonation of a large stock of 
military high explosives occurred at a storage facility located in the city of Lagos, 
Nigeria. In addition to the main explosion, many fires and smaller explosions 
were created by the kick-outs 7), which created panic that spread to other areas. 
As people fled the scene, many stumbled into a darkness-concealed canal and 
drowned. The explosion and its aftermath are believed to have killed at least 
1,100 people and displaced over 20,000, with many thousands injured. 8)
• On 11 July 2011, at 5 :50 in the morning, an explosion tore through the Evan-
gelos Florakis Naval Base in Cyprus. The cause of this mass explosion was 
determined to be the auto-ignition of propellant, which was stored incorrectly, 
in an inappropriate location and exposed to high temperatures, humidity and 
temperature fluctuations, without having determined the propellant stabilizer 
level, a very important surveillance requirement for propellant. The immediate 
consequence was the loss of 13 personnel, with another 62 injured. The dead 
included the commander of the Navy, the commander of the Naval Base, four 
other Navy personnel, and six fire fighters who were trying to extinguish the 
blaze that led to the explosion. The resulting blast destroyed a nearby power 
plant and damaged buildings at the villages of Mari and Zygi, 1.7 km and 4.5 
km away, respectively, from the blast site. Loss of the Vassilikou power station, 
which provided approximately 50% of the power capacity for Cyprus, resulted in 
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rolling blackouts lasting two to three hours, for months after. It has been estimated 
that the cost of this entirely preventable disaster reached 10% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of Cyprus at the time. 9)
• An explosion occurred in the Brak Al-Chati ammunition storage area in southern 
Libya on 28 November 2013, killing over 40 people and injuring many others. Three 
bunkers exploded in the incident, which appeared to have been caused by looters 
igniting a fire to shine some light on their work. There were clear indications that 
the diversion from State stockpiles had been ongoing for an extended period of 
time with many, if not all, of the 20 bunkers emptied of bombs and projectiles. 10) 
Consequently, illegally trafficked weapons and ammunition from Libya have been 
traced to at least 12 other States in the region, and beyond.
• The New York Times reported an explosion that occurred on 23 September 2017, 
at an ammunition depot in the town of Vinnytsya, about 160 miles southwest of 
Kiev, Ukraine. One of the Ukrainian Army’s largest ammunition depots caught 
fire overnight, setting off gigantic explosions and forcing the evacuation of about 
30,000 people. Like a fireworks display, rocket artillery flew out of the depot in all 
directions, tracing glowing arcs through the night sky. Other ammunition, such as 
tank rounds, were thrown out of the depot into the surrounding area. The blasts 
posed a serious danger to air traffic, passing trains and nearby communities. 
According to the Ukrainian authorities, the depot held about 200,000 tonnes of 
ammunition, and although it was unclear how much was at risk, the firepower 
was on clear display. As warehouses exploded, gigantic, apocalyptic fireballs 
rose high above the site. 11)
Figure 3 –  Drone footage of an explosion in ammunition  
storage area in Balakleya, Ukraine 12)
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How stockpile management contributes to achieving  
the Sustainable Development Goals
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents a useful framework to 
articulate the many potential contributions of ammunition management to broader 
peace, security and development outcomes. Ammunition stockpile management 
may be approached in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
as recognized in General Assembly resolution 72/55 “Problems arising from the 
accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus”. 13) The resolution 
encourages States to consider ammunition management as an intrinsic part of 
their actions for achieving relevant SDG targets and urges them to develop national 
indicators to measure it.
 Effective ammunition management mitigates the risk of storage depots 
accidentally exploding in populated areas. These explosions, when they 
occur, are humanitarian disasters that lead to death, injury, economic loss, 
displacement and destruction of infrastructure and private property.
Strengthening the institutional capacities of States to better control 
arms and ammunition help prevent conflict, violence, terrorism and 
crime.
SDG 16, dedicated to peace, justice and strong institutions is a natural entry point 
for national ammunition management. Improving ammunition security and safety 
is a key measure to curbing illicit arms flows (encapsulated in SDG target 16.4) 
and preventing unplanned explosions. 
Figure 4 –  Testing electronic artillery fuzes during surveillance.  
(Source : Ammunition Technical Trade UK)
02
OVERVIEW  
OF THE IATG 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The UN General Assembly requested the development of guidelines for ammunition 
management in 2008. 14) The IATG were subsequently developed to improve safety 
and security of ammunition stockpiles, and efficiency in their management. They are 
based on international “good practice” and accepted explosive science, and provide 
a common language and a frame of reference for States. Containing an integrated 
quality management system, the IATG allow for a progressive improvement in 
ammunition safety and security, in line with the national context and available 
resources. As such, the IATG encourage authorities to achieve and demonstrate 
significant risk reductions in ammunition stockpile safety and security.
Designed to assist States in developing their own national standards and standing 
operating procedures (SOPs), the IATG can be used to inform the development of 
national standards. Taking into account the diversity of States and their available 
material, financial and technical resources, the Risk Reduction Process Levels 
(RRPL) embedded in the IATG offer a system of ascending comprehensiveness in 
risk management. Accordingly, and regardless of their respective baseline, all States 
can utilize the IATG as a framework for assessing and improving their ammunition 
stockpile management processes. 
The UN SaferGuard Programme manages the IATG and undertakes a formal review of 
the IATG on a five-year basis to ensure that the IATG reflect developing ammunition 
stockpile management norms and practices, and to incorporate changes due to 
changing international regulations and requirements.
2.2 NATIONAL USE OF THE IATG
Stockpile management in accordance with international good practice is important in 
ensuring that a national authority fulfills its duty of care and oversees the adequate 
management of ammunition stockpiles. The IATG provide freely available, commonly 
accepted, good practice that can be adopted by any State. As such, the IATG can be 
used to provide the State with detailed technical elements that support policy and 
legislation. They also form the basis for the drafting of national standards and SOPs 
for individual ammunition and explosives facilities. The preparation and application 
of the IATG are shaped by four guiding principles :
• Right of national governments to apply national standards to their national ammunition 
stockpiles ;
• Need to protect those most at risk from undesirable explosion events (e.g. local 
civilian communities and explosives workers) ; 
• Requirement to build national capacity to develop, maintain and apply appropriate 
standards for stockpile management ; and
• Need to maintain consistency and compliance with other international norms, 
conventions and agreements.
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It is important that national authorities adhere to these guiding principles, and that 
improvements in stockpile management, where needed, are made in an integrated 
and graduated manner, as resources become available.
Whereas the IATG provide a range of options and procedures towards effective 
stockpile management, they also acknowledge that it can be an expensive process. 
The scarcity of resources and conflicting national priorities for these resources in 
some States mean that it is neither possible nor desirable to establish a global set 
of criteria to dictate standards for ammunition management. Responding to such 
resource and capacity gaps, the IATG are structured as a guidance framework 
that provides options for a gradual improvement in safety and security within a 
national risk management process. The IATG do not define a detailed way in which 
ammunition safety and security requirements are to be achieved by every State : 
these should be covered in national and local codes of practice.
2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE IATG VOLUMES
The IATG are comprehensive technical documents that are intended for use by 
suitably qualified and experienced persons, whose competence enables them to 
interpret, explain and apply the internationally recognized good practice contained 
in the IATG. 
IATG 01.10 (Introduction to Ammunition Technical Guidelines) 15) explains the back-
ground, legal standing and framework of the IATG. When defining and drafting policy 
for managing ammunition and explosives, policy-makers and technical experts can 
make a good start by considering which areas of ammunition management their 
national policy will address within this generic framework :
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Table 1 – The 12 thematic volumes of the IATG
Series Generic area
01 Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
02 Risk Management
03 Ammunition Accounting
04 Explosive Facilities (Storage) (Field and Temporary Conditions)
05 Explosive Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)
06 Explosive Facilities (Storage) (Operations)
07 Ammunition Processing
08 Transport of Ammunition
09 Security of Ammunition
10 Ammunition Demilitarization and Destruction
11 Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation
12 Ammunition Operational Support
2.4 USE OF TECHNICAL LANGUAGE
Since their introduction, there have been requests for the IATG to be simplified for 
the non-technical user. This continues to be resisted because they are meant to cover 
the bulk of activities involved in through-life management (TLM) of ammunition. 
To this end, the IATG must be technically detailed so that State ammunition and 
explosives practitioners, as well as international assistance providers, can extract 
relevant technical information in necessary detail, to ensure the safe and secure 
management of ammunition and explosives in conformity with international good 
practice. In this vein, oversimplification would introduce the risk of applying unsafe 
practices.
One of the outcomes of writing and implementing national standards is to give policy- 
makers and practitioners, at all levels, the tools that they need to deliver safe and 
secure ammunition management, in terms that all can understand and agree upon. In 
this way, a glossary of local terms can be created that links to the technical language 
and the glossary of the IATG 16). In turn, this enables effective communication 
between different groups involved in national ammunition management. In the 
realm of the policy writer with responsibility for drafting national standards, there 
are terms that should be agreed at the outset. These are listed and described in 
the glossary at the end of this guide.
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2.5 AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
According to IATG 01.10, stockpile management refers to the procedures and activities 
on safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation, handling and disposal of 
conventional ammunition. These are often complex technical areas that, to be safe 
and secure, require specialist management structures and procedures. The UN General 
Assembly 17) has recognized the importance of appropriate national ammunition 
management structures and procedures. These include laws and regulations, 
training and doctrine, equipment and maintenance, personnel management and 
finances and infrastructure problems arising from the accumulation of conventional 
ammunition stockpiles in surplus. 
Appropriate national management structures and procedures ensure sustainability in 
ammunition management. In this regard, the UN General Assembly 18) emphasises 
the central role of the provision of technical assistance and capacity building to 
Member States upon their request (A/RES/72/55) :
• Encouraging States, as appropriate, to consider ammunition management as 
an intrinsic part of their actions for achieving relevant targets of the Sustainable 
Development Goals related to the reduction of illicit arms flows and the pre-
vention of violence through strengthened institutions, and to consider, where 
relevant, developing national, regional and sub-regional indicators based on this 
understanding ; 
• Encouraging States, where relevant, to develop voluntary national action plans on 
the safe and secure management of conventional ammunition, and acknowledges 
the utility of information-sharing and the benefit of good practices among States, 
as appropriate.
In this vein, IATG 01.10 states that the primary responsibility for conventional ammunition 
stockpile management shall rest with the government of the State holding the 
ammunition. This responsibility should normally be vested in an authority, which 
is charged with the regulation, management and coordination of conventional 
ammunition stockpile management. The national authority shall be responsible for 
establishing the national and local conditions that enable the effective management 
of conventional ammunition. It is ultimately responsible for all phases and all facets 
of the stockpile management processes within its national boundaries, including 
the development of national standards, SOPs and instructions.
Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs) to UN peacekeeping operations are further 
expected to, in addition to adhering to UN policies and procedures, develop SOPs 
alongside national standards for the sound management of the ammunition stockpiles 
within their national contingents deployed around the globe, to harness the UN 
safety requirements and local conditions of the host States.
19 |
02
 —
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f t
he
 IA
TG
2.6  FUNCTIONAL AREAS WITHIN CONVENTIONAL  
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
IATG 01.30 (Policy development and advice) 19) notes that stockpile management is 
not only about the technical requirements of ensuring the safety and security of 
ammunition and explosives but also covers areas such as the determination of 
stockpile size, types of stockpile and the management of ammunition in service. 
In establishing the scope for national standards, a holistic approach is encouraged. 
National standards should encompass safety, security and through-life management 
aspects of ammunition management. The IATG approach this by recognition of six 
functional areas within conventional ammunition management. For ease of reference, 
the functional areas and requirements (functions) with corresponding IATG are 
offered in Table 2 (see IATG 01.30, Table 1).
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Table 2 – Functional areas in conventional ammunition stockpile management
Functional 
Area
Requirements IATG
Ammunition 
Management
• Inventory Management System and Procedures
• Risk Management System and Procedures
• Procurement System and Procedures
• Hazard Classification System
• Accident, Fault and Performance Failure 
Investigation Capability and Procedures
• Ammunition Surveillance and In-Service Proof 
Capability and Procedures
• IATG 03.10
• IATG 02.10
• N/A
• IATG 01.50
• IATG 01.60, 01.70, 
11.10 and 11.20
• IATG 07.20
Ammunition 
Storage
• Field and Temporary Storage Procedures and 
Operations
• Depot Storage Procedures and Operations
• Safe Depot Storage Infrastructure
• Unit Storage Procedures and Operations
• Safe Unit Storage Infrastructure
• IATG 04.10
• IATG 06 Series
• IATG 05 Series
• IATG 06 Series
• IATG 12 Series
Ammunition 
Processing
• Ammunition Inspection Capability and 
Procedures
• Ammunition Maintenance Capability and 
Procedures
• Ammunition Repair Capability and Procedures
• Ammunition Process Building Infrastructure
• IATG 06 Series 
and 07.10
• IATG 06 Series 
and07.10
• IATG 06 Series
• IATG 05 Series
Ammunition 
Disposal
• Identification of Ammunition for Disposal 
Methodology
• Disposal Technology and Infrastructure
• Disposal Capability and Procedures
• IATG 03.10 
• IATG 10.10
• IATG 10.10
Ammunition 
Security
• Physical Security Infrastructure of Explosive 
Storage Areas
• Security System Capability and Procedures
• Vetting System for Staff
• IATG 09.10 
• IATG 09.10
• IATG 09.10
Ammunition 
Transport
• Transport Procedures in accordance with 
International and National Legislation
• Intrinsically Safe Vehicles
• IATG 08.10 
• N/A
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The aim of this chapter is to help understand the scope and content of national 
standards and walk through the main processes in their development. This is achieved 
by, as far as possible without being prescriptive, addressing the various issues in 
the format of what is the issue, why is it important and how can it be addressed.
A national standard is a document that is executed by the national authority to 
comply with the regulatory framework and to control the safety, security, quality 
and efficiency of the ammunition and explosives sector. It is important that it is 
written by and for the State by the national authority because national authorities 
understand the political, cultural, social, economic and technical needs that the 
legislature must address, better than any external agency could. The proposed 
outlined process for developing national standards, which belies a great deal of 
detail to be addressed in each stage, is shown in figure 5 and Annex II. 
Figure 5 – Outline process for developing national standards for ammunition management
Implement, review and amend 
Allocate resources to achieve goals 
Real estate Equipment Funds Time People
Assign goals and milestones 
Prioritization of activities Drafting national standards SMART objectives
Establish strategy and priorities 
International
norms
Regional
obligations
Existing national
norms IATG
Decision on
national standards
Map the options and choose the most appropriate 
Understanding challenges Commitment to safeammunition management Demonstration of commitment
Initiate legislation 
Risk acceptance Safeguarding law Formalizing national authority
Understand the problem
Baseline risk assessments Analysis of environment Capabilities assessment
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3.1 UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM
Effective management of national ammunition stocks is a complex and costly 
endeavour. The challenges are even greater in conflict-affected States due to lack 
of resources, infrastructure and trained personnel. Yet, all ammunition management 
environments can be characterized by some struggle over resources and a degree 
of pressure to address concerns related to ammunition safety and security. In order 
to decide what to do first, where it sits in the hierarchy of complex problems, how 
to set goals and eventually achieve them, a State’s legislature and national authority 
need to understand the scale and scope of the issues pertinent to ammunition 
and explosives in their State. 
Box 1 –  Emergence and evolution of ammunition management standards in  
the United Kingdom
The UK’s development of its national standards for explosives and ammunition 
management dates back to the 19th century. The Explosives Act of 1875 was the first 
piece of civil legislation to address the control of explosives and was introduced to 
prevent the diversion of explosives to anarchists and Irish Republican groups. During 
this period, single service ammunition and explosive regulations, issued under the 
authority of the Secretary of State for War, covered the control and management of 
ammunition in magazines, in the hands of army field units, and in Royal Navy shore 
establishments and vessels.
In 1974, a number of statutory instruments were issued under the primary Health and 
Safety at Work Act, which covered the control, manufacture and storage of explosives. 
UK military explosive regulations were later rationalized into a single set of joint service 
explosive regulations in 2000. As a result of the catastrophic loss of a Nimrod aircraft 
over Afghanistan in 2006, major changes were made to how the UK assures the safety 
of all of its defence-related activities. Though ammunition and explosives were not the 
cause of the aircraft loss, it resulted in the creation of the Defence Ordnance, Munitions 
and Explosives Safety Regulator. 
The principal drivers today for the development of UK national standards and 
regulations for ammunition control and management come from the UK’s interaction 
with supranational entities such as the United Nations, the European Union and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Author : Bob Seddon. Source : Development and Evolution of 
National Ammunition Management Standards in the UK. 
Unpublished background paper. Geneva : Small Arms Survey
Experiences shared by government representatives, the UN, military and interna-
tional organizations conclude that unplanned explosions and diversion are symptoms 
of various shortcomings : lack of political awareness, lack of staff capacity, skills 
and adequate infrastructure, or institutional, governance and oversight issues. 20) 
Whereas “national ownership is a pre-requisite, commitment at the top level of 
government does, however, not necessarily trickle down to those actually doing 
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the job on the ground. On occasion, implementing agencies are asked for support, 
but once in country, cooperation from local storage holders is not guaranteed. 
Likewise, commitment may be found on the ground whilst lacking at the top level, 
requiring that it be nurtured at all levels. Effective ammunition management is driven 
nationally and takes into account country-specific situations.” 21)
Accordingly, national authority and international assistance providers should consider 
using structured analytical techniques and tools to determine the baseline for safety 
and security risks to be addressed, the influence of external factors on national 
ammunition management, and assessment of national capabilities. Below are 
three exemplary tools for a structured approach to examining potential risks with 
ammunition :
Risk reduction baseline study
In the IATG, the different tasks and activities necessary for safe, efficient and effective 
stockpile management are considered to equate to one of three Risk Reduction 
Process Levels (RRPLs), indicated within each IATG as either LEVEL 1 (basic), 
LEVEL 2 (intermediate) or LEVEL 3 (advanced), depending on the degree of com-
plexity of each task or activity.
The UN SaferGuard Programme provides an online RRPL checklist tool 22) that 
can be used to develop a snapshot of the current state of a single ammunition 
site against the RRPLs described in IATG 01.20. The RRPL checklist is useful for 
obtaining information about the risks concerning a storage or processing site at any 
point in time. It can be used to capture the baseline as the national authority sets 
about improving ammunition safety management and then measuring progress 
by comparison of new checklists against old ones, as improvement measures are 
introduced and used.
Using the tool, RRPLs are determined by calculating a weighted score of all the 
questions answered about an ammunition stockpile site. To achieve a given RRPL, 
the site’s score must meet or exceed the appropriate score threshold and all critical 
questions for the RRPL must be satisfactorily answered. To make best use of the 
RRPL checklist tool, as part of the baseline study, the analyst will need to extract 
and collate information from site reports to identify trends. It should be looking for 
generic areas and groups of activities where there is consistently good practice as 
well as those where there is cause for concern.
To determine the status of a State’s ammunition stockpile, all its ammunition 
stockpile locations would need to be assessed and the individual results compiled 
into a composite status report. The status report would establish a baseline from 
which to move forward. The national authority should pay particular attention to 
those questions that relate to safety-critical activities and, if there is a national 
trend of not meeting the requirements of these activities, recommend actions 
to improve the situation. Trends so identified inform the national authority about 
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general areas of concern and feed into the strategic and operational plans for achieving 
the national ammunition safety and security goals. Spotting emerging risks that 
involve ammunition and explosives before they materialize is obviously a life-saving 
activity but can also prove tremendously helpful in deciding on the priorities i.e. 
which standards to develop first.
It is proposed that national standards are based on the IATG 01.20 principle that 
“the basic aim of a conventional ammunition stockpile management organisation 
should be to make sure that stockpile management processes are maintained at 
Risk Reduction Process Level 1 as a minimum, which will reduce risk significantly”. 
Ongoing and gradual improvements should then be made to the stockpile man-
agement infrastructure and processes as staff development improves and further 
resources become available. A national authority should take note that the rate of 
progress towards overall RRPL 1 and beyond is under their control and that it is 
quite possible for a site to be at RRPL 2 or RRPL 3 for one activity while not yet 
being at RRPL 1 for others. 
PESTLE analysis
As a national authority acknowledges the presence of a problem involving ammu-
nition and explosive materials, the authority and its partners may seek to identify 
the underlying causes and contributing factors to the problem. Understanding 
the problem environment is a pre-requisite for the development of effective and 
responsive policies, legislation and national standards to tackle it. PESTLE 23) analysis 
provides one methodology for this. A national authority can use PESTLE to map 
multiple interlinked factors that may have contributed to the problem and assess 
the effects of these factors outside the authority’s control on its performance.
PESTLE frames the identified problem with six external factors, to allow a judgement 
to be made on their importance within the problem. The factors to consider are 
political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental, each that may 
have either a positive (opportunities) or negative (threats) influence on the problem. 
Refer to Annex III for unpacking PESTLE in the ammunition risk mapping context, 
pertinent to the development and prioritization of standards.
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Figure 6 – External factors that may influence known risks from ammunition stockpiles
National
Ammunition
Stockpile
Political
Technological
Economic
Social
Environmental
Legal
Capability lines of development
In most States, ammunition and explosives are a significant defence capability. 
Ministries of defence make use of capability lines of development to ensure a 
common approach to the introduction, sustainability of new and existing capabilities, 
as well as disposal of obsolete capabilities. Ensuring the interoperability of different 
systems and organizations involved in ammunition stockpile management is at the 
core of such capability development. The lines of development are also used to 
analyze the existing capabilities so that areas for improvement can be identified in a 
State, hence providing valuable advice to its national standards development process.
In this vein, the UN SaferGuard Programme is currently considering a new IATG 
module addressing “organisational capabilities” to be included in the forthcoming 
version 3 of the IATG to be released in 2020. Once approved, this module will 
introduce elements integral to organisational capability development, including 
processes, functional roles and “capability enabling lines”. It will describe the 
interaction between these three elements, and explain key processes in the life 
cycle of ammunition, namely the planning, evaluation, procurement, introduction, 
utilisation and decommissioning.
National authorities should note that although these capability development frame-
works are commonly used by the military, they are equally applicable for a State that 
is developing complex capabilities. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Ministry 
of Defence acknowledges eight distinct lines of capability development, namely 
training, equipment, personnel, information, concepts and doctrine, organization, 
infrastructure, and logistics. Refer to Annex IV for a description of the UK model 
of capability lines of development.
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3.2 INITIATE LEGISLATION
In establishing national standards, legislation is required to bring them into force. The 
legislature will need to enact laws that assist the establishment and authorization of 
the national authority (regulator) ; the adoption of the relevant IATG as the basis for 
national standards ; and the application of the IATG in national standards and SOPs.
Once appointed, the national authority has a legal responsibility to ensure that the 
risks that their explosives present to the general public are both tolerable and as 
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), should an explosive event occur in storage 
or during transport. This safeguarding of the public and the personnel involved in 
ammunition management should be enshrined in legislation. A safeguarding law 
should prevent the establishment of dwellings within the safeguarded area. Should 
dwellings nonetheless remain in the safeguarded area, the law should stipulate 
options to guide political decisions to address the risk : 
• The explosive quantity permitted for storage shall be reduced within the facility 
to a tolerable risk level ;
• The increased risk to the civilian population shall be formally accepted by the State 
and communicated to the residents along with entitlement to a due compensation 
in the event of an accident ;
• The civilian population shall be moved from the safeguarded area ;
•  The ammunition shall be moved from the safeguarded area to another location.
Refer to Annex V for guidance on the rationale for safeguarding law.
The legislature should make a statement in legislation or regulation that it either adopts 
the societal and individual risk levels that are suggested in Table 3 of IATG 02.10, or 
provides nationally accepted tolerable risk levels. The national authority then has 
a baseline from which it can make reasonable judgements when translating the 
RRPLs into national standards.
The national authority and legislature need to appreciate that there will always be 
a degree of risk associated with each RRPL. The overall degree of risk accepted by 
the State will reduce as more and more of the processes and practices linked to 
each RRPL are applied. National authorities should note the warnings in IATG 04.10 
and 04.20 that quantity distances for field and temporary storage provide short-term 
solutions ; not the same degree of protection as those for permanent facilities 
given in IATG 02.20.
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3.3 MAP THE OPTIONS AND CHOOSE THE MOST APPROPRIATE
Once the challenges pertaining to ammunition stockpiles are understood and reported 
by the national authority, the legislature will better understand the multi-faceted 
nature of the challenge and therefore the options and any recommendations made 
by the national authority.
The legislature and national authority will make a judgement on what activities 
are necessary to achieve an acceptable and achievable level of ammunition and 
explosives safety and security for the State. This could take the form of a roadmap 
and involve a decision published as a governmental statement, edict or decree 
informing that the State will take the necessary actions to adopt the principles and 
good practice of the IATG. This, or a formal act of the legislature, will demonstrate 
the State’s commitment to ammunition and explosives safety. Having this formal 
commitment would give the international community confidence in providing assis-
tance to the national authority to develop national standards and in supporting the 
necessary enabling projects. Such public commitment to adopt an internationally 
recognized guidance framework should also prevent well-meaning international 
assistance providers from delivering equipment, infrastructure or training that is 
inappropriate at a particular stage of the State’s capability development.
3.4 ESTABLISH STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES
An ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy that comes from the 
heart of government demonstrates to internal agencies that the State’s ammunition 
and explosives stockpile management issues have been given serious consideration. 
It also indicates that a way to improve the situation has been identified, if not yet in 
place. Equally important, it demonstrates to external supporters and agencies that 
the problem is going to be addressed and provides a platform for bids for financial 
and/or physical assistance. 
A good national strategy will explain the issues to be addressed, their relative 
importance in the contexts of the existing security, economic and political realities, 
and the State’s intent to improve the situation over time.
| 30
03
 —
 N
at
io
na
l S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t P
ro
ce
ss
Box 2 – Timescales
In the immediate aftermath of the US-led coalition military operations in Iraq in 2003, 
it was estimated that clearance of all explosive remnants of war could take over 50 
years. In Ukraine, it is estimated that disposing of all Soviet-era stockpiles at the current 
pace will require more than 100 years. Meanwhile, the national authorities in Laos and 
Vietnam have estimated at least 200 years of work to remove all explosive hazards 
from the wars of the 1960s. In Europe, several States still come across explosive 
ordnance from World War 2. It seems obvious that an explosives and ammunition 
safety and security strategy should be able to reduce the hazards and risks to levels 
that are acceptable to all parties involved and achievable in an acceptable timeframe, 
with available resources. National authorities and international assistance providers 
understand that in most cases in recent history, the challenge pertinent to ammunition 
and explosives is not something that can be solved over a short period of time.
The national authority therefore needs to advise the legislature on a strategy that 
can achieve reasonable levels of explosives safety and security appropriate for the 
State. Ideally, the State ambition will align with appropriate Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and lean towards internationally accepted norms contained in the 
IATG. The ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy should also 
align with relevant security sector reform (SSR) strategies, goals and development 
programmes that might be in place. Experience suggests that the level of political 
will and availability of resources will determine the actual timescale for achieving 
strategic goals in ammunition safety and security but that planners should think 
in terms of a 20- to 50-year programme, depending on the magnitude of risk and 
response capabilities at the outset.
Requirements for through-life management of ammunition
To effectively mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions and diversion from stockpiles, 
ammunition management requires complex systems, which present planning 
challenges and have significant budgetary implications for governments. A systems- 
based approach to through-life management of ammunition and a long-term strategy 
to execute it can help a State to address these challenges and, in particular, to mitigate 
diversion and the risk of unplanned explosions at munitions sites. A statement that 
reflects through-life approach to planning, procurement, safe and secure stockpile 
management and ultimate disposal of ammunition and explosives could be included 
in the strategy with the details included in associated national standards.
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Box 3 –  Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) :  
developing an ammunition master plan
While the international community substituted expertise for a lack of national capacity 
in post-conflict BiH up to 2012, it subsequently built government capacity to ensure its 
ownership of the system for life-cycle management of ammunition (LCMA). Following 
its establishment in December 2010, the EUFOR Ammunition and Weapon Storage 
Site Management Mobile Training Team (MTT project) played a key role in this process. 
Since then, the MTT project has :
–  Provided needs-based, tailor-made, modular ammunition management training 
courses, which the BiH Ministry of Defence (MoD) subsequently integrated into the 
BiH armed forces structure and curricula ;
–  Coordinated equipment donations for stockpile management capacity building and 
training efforts ; and
–  Provided advice to the BiH MoD and the armed forces for sustainable LCMA, 
particularly the development of regulations and SOPs for stockpile management, 
including for ammunition accounting and disposal.
The international community has also encouraged BiH government and armed forces 
personnel, including the minister of defence and chief of defence, to take a more 
prominent role in addressing the challenges posed by the vast ammunition stockpiles. 
As a result of these efforts, high ranking BiH government personnel have taken the lead 
in related decision-making and planning, including through the development of the 
Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives Master Plan.
Source : Carapic and Holtom, 
Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper, 2018
3.5 ASSIGN GOALS AND MILESTONES
Acknowledging that achieving the highest standard of explosives security and safety 
management can take decades, and that available resources to accelerate this 
process are limited in any State ; a step-by-step approach to achieving the State’s 
desired end-state should be encouraged. If the State’s published intent is to apply 
the IATG as the basis of explosives security and safety regulations, the national 
authority will need to understand the goals and milestones that are to be achieved 
and write national standards that enable those goals and required working practices. 
The national authority will need to advise on setting the State’s goals. Knowing 
the baseline and desired end-state, the national authority should use, for example, 
information resulting from the above risk reduction baseline study, PESTLE and 
capability lines of development analyses, to establish interim goals that will lead to 
the end-state. To fit these goals into a structured plan, they should contain SMART 
objectives, i.e. being specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound. 
Including SMART objectives for established goals will support their implementation, 
simplify monitoring and improve arguments for funds and other resources. 
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To reduce risk significantly, IATG (01.20) encourages ongoing improvements to the 
stockpile management infrastructure and processes as staff development improves 
and further resources become available. Let us assume that the State’s ammunition 
and explosives safety management strategy is to achieve RRPL1 as a major milestone. 
The aim of national RRPL goal-setting should be to :
• Rank the results 24) of the national authority’s gap analyses according to :
• How important they are in the overall strategy
• How feasible they are within existing resources
• How feasible they are with external assistance
• Determine the order in which the gaps are to be filled, i.e. set the national authority’s 
goals or objectives. The national authority should consider setting these goals 
in the manner of SMART objectives.
• Put in place a monitoring and auditing regime to measure progress.
Gap analysis identifies and analyses gaps between the optimal resource allocation 
and the current allocation level to reveal areas that can be improved. If a State, for 
example, has set an ammunition safety management strategy of achieving RRPL1, 
the activities that trigger a “RRPL1 Level RED” outcome on the RRPL checklist 
are gaps in capability that need to be plugged.
3.6 ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE GOALS
The framework of goals and objectives should support the priorities of work in a 
national context including which IATG, and in what order, are to be applied in national 
standards. The priorities are sensitive to the circumstances that prevail in each State 
context at a given time. There are some generalities however, that come about 
from the political, economic, cultural and historical factors that affect all States. In 
general, all States have a duty to ensure the safety of their people i.e. defending 
them from internal and external threats. Accepting this premise, a State will need 
security forces and law enforcement that are properly constituted, trained and 
armed to meet these threats effectively. 
The first ammunition- and explosives-related decision to be made by the State is 
therefore to define the roles, size and structure of its security forces. This in turn will 
define the weapons required and therefore the ammunition for these weapons. 
The activities that should take place at early stages in the development and imple-
mentation of national standards include at least : disposal of surplus/unsafe stock ; 
movement of ammunition to safe and secure storage or disposal facilities ; storage 
in depots and small units ; and management of storage and disposal facilities. Since 
the aim of national standards is to underpin the State policy about the safety and 
security of ammunition and explosives, it seems that all of these essential activities 
are of equal priority and mutually supportive, therefore to be included in the early 
iterations of national standards.
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Resource allocation is made difficult given these priority activities. It is the national 
authority’s responsibility to advise the government, as well as the owners of the 
available resources, on what needs to be done (informed by the structured analytical 
process discussed on pp. 25-27), what can be achieved using the existing resources, 
and what needs to be done using external assistance. Resources for ammunition 
management cannot be summed up in a guide – each State having different priorities 
and available funds.
The scale of the problem to be resolved can be understood once the legislature 
and the national authority consider the resources that are required, against those 
that are available : real estate, people, equipment, funds and time. The issue of safe 
and secure management of ammunition cannot be resolved solely by throwing 
money at it. Resources that a State has in its power are :
• Funding
Effective ammunition stockpile management and improvements or enhancements 
can be expensive. The State will want to use its own funds efficiently and can also 
call upon assistance from international providers. 
• People
Suitably qualified and experienced ammunition and explosives specialists are 
necessary for the efficient, safe and secure management of the ammunition stockpile. 
Many States have such people in their population, either military or civilian, but 
experience in conflict-affected States suggests that these individuals can be 
overlooked in the drive to rehabilitate combatants and rebuild the State. In terms 
of effective capacity building, the legislature should endeavour to find existing 
specialists and/or to make use of international assistance opportunities to recruit, 
train and sustain this expertise within their national authority and ammunition 
management system.
• Real estate
Safe and secure storage, processing, disposal, test and evaluation, and handling 
of ammunition and explosives require considerable investment in real estate. 
The national authority needs to ensure that any land occupied has a safeguarded 
area or “buffer zone”, which might be owned by private individuals or government ; 
either way, the national authority must have a good working relationship with the 
national and/or local authority that is responsible for the land.
• Equipment
Ammunition and explosives handling requires both common and special equipment, 
depending on the explosive article and the process or activity being undertaken. 
Specialist equipment could be provided by the ammunition manufacturer or 
specified by the national authority or their process engineer. All equipment can 
be costly to either purchase or lease and the national authority or procurement 
organization should always ensure that there is a suitable maintenance contract 
and package associated with the purchase or lease. All equipment must be 
maintained correctly to ensure that it is safe to use and store. The national authority 
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should consider having its own research and development department for designing, 
manufacturing, testing and approving tools and equipment that will be used in 
its facilities.
• Time
The State should control the arrival and departure times of imports and exports of 
ammunition and explosives. The national authority should be able to make fairly 
accurate estimates of the duration of projects to aid planning of major events 
such as the opening of new facilities, the carrying out of safeguarding routines 
and special facility inspections. All of these time factors should be accounted for 
in the State’s ammunition and explosives management strategy and the various 
SMART objectives that come out of the gap analysis discussed earlier.
3.7 DETERMINE TOPICS TO BE COVERED IN NATIONAL STANDARDS
Experience in adopting and applying international standards shows that not every 
part of the IATG should be included in national standards. Not all of the IATG modules 
will be relevant to a State context. Some States have existing standards for explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD), for example, and corresponding systems for training and 
regimes. When drafting national standards, selecting the critical and achievable 
IATG volumes and modules first, in particular in a state with limited resources, is a 
better approach than attempt to directly adopt a comprehensive set of international 
standards, or a de facto a copy of the IATG.
Within the national standards chapters that the national authority has selected to 
draft, it is suggested that the national authority make use of relevant IATG but, more 
importantly, only those elements from within the IATG that will be used immediately 
and will support the next one or two stages of the process towards safe and secure 
management of ammunition.
Is the premise of achieving RRPL 1 reasonable for my country’s needs ? 
Risk Reduction Process Level 1 describes a level of risk that should be tolerable 
in most societies, acceptable to most governments and achievable given suitable 
support and resources. 
The meaning of RRPL 1 is that : 
• Basic safety precautions are in place to reduce the risk of undesirable explosions 
during ammunition storage, but fatalities and injuries to individuals in local civilian 
communities may still occur. 
• Although some potential causes of such explosions have been addressed (external 
fires, smoking, mobile phones etc.), others remain (propellant instability, handling, 
lightning strike). 
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• Risk of explosion still remains, as routine physical inspection of the ammunition 
does not occur and the chemical stability of ammunition during storage cannot be 
determined by analysis. 
• Basic security precautions are in place to reduce the risk of theft by external actions. 
• Ammunition has been accounted for by quantity, and a basic system of identifying 
loss or theft is in place.
• A minimal investment of resources has taken place in organizational development, 
operating procedures and storage infrastructure.
Section 5 of IATG 01.20 25) lists the IATG and elements within them that are directly 
relevant to RRPL1. It is a helpful resource to assist planning in a national context 
regarding what is urgent, what is important, and how to take steps toward enhanced 
safety and security in the development and implementation of national standards. 
Which IATG modules should be considered and why ?
IATG risk reduction measures can be understood to primarily benefit the civilian 
population in proximity to a stockpile of ammunition, and the personnel involved in 
managing it. Regardless of the applicable RRPL, one of the best ways to plan and 
situate storage areas is to put the ammunition a safe distance away (IATG 02.20) 
from people either by moving the ammunition, or by moving the people. When 
these requirements cannot be met, a detailed consequence analysis must be 
carried out to fully understand the effects of not meeting required safe distances. 
The residual risk must be approved at the right level of authority within the State, 
and communicated to local population and personnel affected. With a view to 
immediate safety and security improvements, table 3 lays out all IATG modules 
and suggests priority considerations for the establishment of national standards 
and the implementation of specific elements within ammunition management.
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Table 3 – Suggested priority considerations on elements within ammunition management
Volume Module Priority
01  Introduction 
and Principles 
of Ammunition 
Management
01.10 Guide to the ammunition technical guidelines (IATG) 
01.20 Index of risk reduction process levels 
01.30 Policy development and advice 
01.40 Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations
01.50 UN explosive hazard classification system and codes 
01.60 Ammunition faults and performance failures
01.70 Bans and constraints
01.80 Formulae for ammunition management
01.90 Ammunition management personnel competences 
02 Risk Management 02.10  Introduction to risk management principles and processes 
02.20 Quantity and separation distances 
02.30 Licensing of explosive facilities 
02.40 Safeguarding of explosive facilities 
02.50 Fire safety 
03  Ammunition 
Accounting
03.10 Inventory management 
03.20 Lotting and batching
03.30 International transfer of ammunition module
03.40  End-Use(r) of internationally transferred ammunition 
module
03.50 Tracing of ammunition
04  Explosives 
Facilities : Field 
and Temporary 
Conditions
04.10 Field storage 
04.20 Temporary storage 
05  Explosives 
Facilities : 
Infrastructure and 
Equipment
05.10 Planning and siting of explosives facilities 
05.20 Types of buildings for explosives facilities
05.30 Traverses and barricades 
05.40 Safety standards for electrical installations 
05.50  Vehicles, mechanical handling equipment in explosives 
facilities

05.60 Radio frequency hazards
06  Explosives 
Facilities : 
Operations
06.10 Control of explosive facilities 
06.20 Storage space requirements
06.30 Storage and handling 
06.40 Ammunition packaging and marking
06.50 Specific safety precautions
06.60 Works services (construction and repair)
06.70 Inspection of explosives facilities
06.80 Inspection of ammunition
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Volume Module Priority
07  Ammunition 
Processing
07.10 Safety and risk reduction 
07.20 Surveillance and in-service proof
08  Transport of 
Ammunition
08.10 Transport of ammunition 
09  Security of 
Ammunition
09.10 Security principles and systems
10  Ammunition 
Demilitarization 
and Destruction
10.10  Demilitarization and destruction of conventional 
ammunition

11  Ammunition 
Accidents, 
Reporting and 
Investigation
11.10 Ammunition accidents : reporting and investigation 
11.20 Ammunition accidents : investigation methodology 
11.30  EOD clearance of ammunition storage area explosions
12  Ammunition 
Operational 
Support
12.10 Ammunition on multi-national operations
12.20 Small unit ammunition storage 
Priority for drafting national standards chapters
Each national authority will have a unique set of priorities that result from its political, 
economic, security, environmental and social situation at any one time. It follows that 
the national authority will draft its national standards to meet these national priorities. 
There are, however, occasions when a newly formed national authority may have to 
start with a completely blank slate. One way of prioritizing the order of writing national 
standards is to base them on the experience of others, basing the framework of 
national standards on the most common activities in a fairly recognizable order of 
occurrence. If we look at this from the viewpoint of an item of ammunition, this 
could look like the following :
• Inspection
The item is inspected to determine what it is, if it is suitable for use and whether 
it is safe to move to a storage or disposal facility. While it is possible to rely on 
the expertise of international assistance providers, local staff will need to be 
able to either make their own decisions on these matters or understand the 
decisions made on their behalf. This will require national standards based on 
understanding the following IATG :
• IATG 01.50 – UN explosive hazard classification system and codes
• IATG 07.10 – Ammunition Processing : safety and risk reduction
• Movement
The item will need to be moved from where it was found, to either a storage 
facility or a disposal area. The national standards will need an understanding of :
• IATG 01.50 – UN Explosive hazard classification system and codes
• IATG 08.10 – Transport of ammunition
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• Storage
A commonly observed route to RRPL1 is for storage facilities to progress from 
field storage, through temporary storage to permanent storage, with small unit 
storage being a permanent requirement. The national authority will therefore 
need to draft national standards appropriately, based on an understanding of :
• IATG 01.50 – UN explosive hazard classification system and codes
• IATG 02.20 – Quantity and separation distances
• IATG 02.30 – Licensing of explosive facilities
• IATG 02.50 – Fire safety
• IATG 04.10 – Field storage
• IATG 04.20 – Temporary storage
• IATG 05.10 – Planning and siting of explosive facilities
• IATG 05.30 – Traverses and barricades
• IATG 05.40 – Safety standards for electrical installations
• IATG 05.50 – Vehicles and mechanical handling equipment in explosive facilities
• IATG 06.10 – Control of explosive facilities
• IATG 06.30 – Storage and handling
• IATG 06.50 – Specific safety precautions
• IATG 12.20 – Small unit ammunition storage
• Disposal
A State is likely to have a problem with legacy munitions that are no longer of any 
use and that must be destroyed. The national standards will require a detailed 
understanding of :
• IATG 10.10 – Demilitarization and destruction of conventional ammunition
• Through-life management of ammunition and explosives
Underpinning all of these activities, the national authority will need to be cognisant 
of the following IATG and draft the relevant national standards when it is appropriate 
to do so :
• IATG 01.10 – Guide to the IATG
• IATG 01.20 – Index of risk reduction process levels
• IATG 01.30 – Policy development and advice
• IATG 01.90 – Ammunition management personnel competences
• IATG 02.10 – Introduction to risk management principles and processes
• IATG 02.40 – Safeguarding of explosive facilities
• IATG 03.10 – Inventory management
• IATG 11.10 – Ammunition accidents : reporting and investigation
• IATG 11.20 – Ammunition accidents : investigation methodology
• IATG 12.10 – Ammunition on multi-national operations
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3.8 NATIONAL STANDARDS FRAMEWORK
Having agreed that the national standards for safety and security of ammunition 
and explosives will be set out in a logical order, or framework, it makes sense to 
ensure that they make reference to other legislation or standards by having links to 
them. This simplifies the national standards, which do not have to be continuously 
updated when other relevant legislation changes.
Establishing minimum requirements
As the national standards will be a normative and legally binding document, they 
should reflect local laws and context but also conform to the IATG. Against this 
background, cutting and pasting from the IATG does not work. Hence the writers 
assigned with the task of drafting national standards should read each “critical and 
achievable IATG module”, write down what that IATG module and already existent 
local regulations say on the topic and create a list of “minimum requirements” for 
the national standard to-be. 
Framework for gradual improvement
Every State must balance its use of resources against competing requirements, 
and ammunition and explosives safety management is no exception. As such, it 
is often not possible to achieve all the aims of the safety and security strategy at 
once but to spread these aims over time in a graduated manner to improve safety 
and security, thereby reducing risk in the process. What is required is a national 
framework to define and manage the various elements of the complex systems 
that are necessary to achieve the State’s goals. This framework must incorporate 
not only the technical elements but the political and economic needs of the State. 
The IATG are a framework for the gradual improvement of ammunition and explosives 
safety practices, i.e. the technical elements of the graduated response. This is 
borne out in the way that the tasks and processes necessary for safe, efficient and 
effective stockpile management are graded against the three RRPLs throughout 
the IATG. These RRPLs are outlined in IATG 01.20. 26)
The national authority can identify the State’s technical requirements by conducting 
an IATG-based RRPL baseline study and advising the legislature on the results, whilst 
making recommendations about how to plug any gaps effectively and efficiently. 
When the framework for gradual improvement is in place, the national authority 
has the role of subsequent audit and progress reporting.
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National ownership
The national authority can only go so far without complete national ownership 
over ammunition and explosives safety and security. Small Arms Survey outlines a 
model 27) for the ammunition life cycle (figure 7) to explain the structural and functional 
elements of ammunition management :
Figure 7 – Small Arms Survey LCMA Model
• Political – the structural element necessary for effectiveness of the functional 
elements ; and
• Technical – the functional elements necessary for the management of ammunition 
across its life cycle.
Disposal
Procurement
Key
National
ownership
Structural element
Functional element
Milestones
Normative framework,
organizational framework,
infrastructure and equipment,
resources.
Planning
Stockpile
management
National ownership implies that a State takes full responsibility for through-life 
management of ammunition, as demonstrated by national authorities’ active en-
gagement in the development, implementation and oversight of a system and the 
provision of adequate financial and other resources to support its implementation. 
National ownership is a precondition for and is fostered by enabling conditions. 
This is a normative framework comprising laws, regulations and standing operating 
procedures to govern the system ; an organizational framework for coordination, 
oversight and implementation of the system ; infrastructure and equipment to 
operationalize the system ; and human resources to implement and maintain related 
processes and activities. 
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Coherence and consistency in national standards
Assuming that the State issues national standards for ammunition and explosives 
safety and security as well as regulations for weapons, the two sets of national standards 
must be coherent, i.e. marked by an orderly, logical and aesthetically consistent 
relation of parts, and be consistent, i.e. not self-contradictory. It is also important for 
the national standards to be coherent and consistent with any other safety-related 
legislation and standards.
Box 4 – United States protective distances criteria adoption
Prior to 1910, there was no federal-level law, standard, or table in the US that specified 
required safe separation distances from or between explosives storage sites. The 
development of such criteria resulted from the concerns of the American Railway 
Association. At that time, there were many instances where explosives storage 
magazines had been built so close to railroads that they represented a hazard to 
passengers should an explosion occur at the time a train was passing. A special 
committee was appointed by the Association of Manufacturers of Powder and High 
Explosives (founded in 1906) to study the problem. The committee reviewed data from 
over one hundred notable explosions involving explosive quantities from 200 pounds 
(91 kg) to 875,000 pounds (396,893 kg). The result of their efforts was the development 
of an American Table of Distances (ATD, 1910), which gave specific, protective distances 
to be applied from explosives storage magazines to inhabited buildings, public 
highways and public railways. In 1913, the Institute of Makers of Explosives adopted the 
table, and the ATD became the accepted standard in the US. 28)
Author : Eric J. Deschambault. 
Source : Unpublished background paper. 
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Box 5 –  Accident leading to American Table of Distances (ATD) adoption by the military 
and origination of the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)
An explosives accident on 10 July 1926, from a lightning strike to an above-ground 
magazine, occurred at Lake Denmark Naval Ammunition Depot, New Jersey (located 
adjacent to Picatinny Arsenal and 3½ miles from Dover, NJ). The initial explosion event 
propagated to additional explosives storage sites. This accident destroyed the depot, 
also causing heavy damage to the adjacent Picatinny Arsenal and the surrounding 
communities, killing 21 people and injuring 51 others. The monetary loss to the navy 
alone was $46 million ($656 million equivalent in 2018). Injuries occurred out to a 
distance of three miles and window breakage extended out to 5 miles. This event caused 
widespread concern and indignation among the public about the practice of building 
arsenals and storing dangerous explosives near populous communities. In response, 
the 70th US Congress directed that the Secretaries of War and Navy prepare a report on 
the subject of ammunition storage conditions. A Joint Board on Ammunition, consisting 
of four military officers, was assigned “to conduct a survey of points of supplies of 
ammunition and components thereof for use of the Army and Navy…” In their report, 
the Board recommended the adoption of the New Jersey explosives law, which had 
incorporated the ATD as its standard of safety. Ultimately this recommendation was 
accepted by the US Congress, which also suggested that a permanent board representing 
the army and navy be established, resulting in the formation of the Joint Army Navy 
Munitions Board in August 1928. This Board used the ATD as its guide for the application 
of safe separation distances. The Joint Board eventually evolved into the DoD Explosives 
Safety Board (DDESB), which exists today and has the responsibility for developing 
Department of Defense Explosives Safety criteria. 29)
Author : Eric J. Deschambault. 
Source : Unpublished background paper.
Format and numbering of national standards chapters
National standards chapters must be numbered for ease of reference for all users. 
The numbering system should allow for updates if the State does not re-issue 
regulations after each change.
The format of national standards should be aligned with the expectations of national 
legislation but simplified to ensure understanding and ease of use. Clarity is a 
vital characteristic and this simplification should make the contents clear without 
compromising the meaning and importance. The set of national standards, and each 
individual standard, should have a logical structure and use common terminology, 
presented in plain language unless a technical term is required, in which case a 
glossary should be provided.
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States applying the IATG should consider using the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 30) format that has been used to write the IATG and other 
international standards and guidelines such as the Modular Small-arms-control 
International Compendium (MOSAIC), 31) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), 32) and International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). 33) ISO is a worldwide federation of national bodies from over 140 states. 
Its work results in international agreements, which are published as ISO standards 
and guides. A list of ISO standards and guides is given in the ISO Catalogue. 34)
Relationship between legislation, national standards and SOPs
Policy and regulations are enacted by the legislature, forming the overarching 
framework for the governance of the safety and security of the State’s ammunition 
and explosives sector. 
The national authority produces and authorizes the national standards to comply 
with the national legislation and to effectively deal with the operations of the 
explosives sector. Subject to the confirmation of the legislature, the standards 
are amendable by the national authority, which may consult with experts from the 
State’s explosives sector and/or international organizations for advice on what is best 
for the State’s needs and requirements.
Standing operating procedures (SOPs) are the documents that describe how the 
legislation and national standards will be practically implemented at the local level. 
SOPs are typically written by relevant technical experts on behalf of the director or 
commander of a facility. Competent SOPs naturally flow from national standards, 
which stem from corresponding legislation, however, the adoption of international 
norms might affect this legislation. Therefore, in writing a national standard, it is 
necessary to know how to adapt it to the local context, existing political and legal 
processes and systems to accommodate the upcoming national standards, and 
how to facilitate their amendment later on.
04
MANAGEMENT 
AND REVIEW 
OF NATIONAL 
STANDARDS
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This chapter aims to provide the national authority or individual that is responsible 
for the creation and upkeep of national standards, with guidance on the day-to-day 
management and the formal and informal review of these standards in keeping 
with internationally accepted good practice.
4.1  TRANSLATING THE IATG RISK REDUCTION PROCESS LEVELS INTO 
NATIONAL STANDARDS
National standards are created and owned by the State, as reflected in the guiding 
principles of the IATG. 35) The IATG are comprehensive in their content but they 
recognize that States have many competing priorities for their finite resources. 
It is widely understood that all States will adopt a risk-based approach to the man-
agement of ammunition and explosives stockpiles and the IATG are written so that 
States or individual ammunition facilities can conduct their activities in a relatively 
safe manner. Relatively, in this context, means that the State or facility commanders 
understand the degree of risk that they are willing to accept when implementing 
national practices and procedures. IATG 02.10 36) provides a good introduction to 
understanding risk management.
4.2  AUDIT AND MONITORING OF PROGRESS TOWARDS  
NATIONAL RRPL GOALS
Having set out how the State will conduct its ammunition and explosives safety 
activities in national standards, the national authority will be expected to provide 
assurance to the legislature (and possibly to international bodies) that the various 
facilities are operating in compliance with the national standards. The national 
authority will, in most cases, be responsible to the legislature for national pro-
gress in achieving the national ammunition and explosives safety strategy and the 
achievement of the specified RRPL. 
To ensure that processes work, they must be audited, the results assessed, a gap 
analysis carried out and an improvement action plan created. Carrying out audits 
and monitoring compliance areas and procedures are essential business functions 
and must be a regulatory requirement. 
The objectives of audit reviews are different from monitoring and auditing : monitoring 
ensures that policies and procedures are in place and are being followed ; and auditing 
determines whether the monitoring programme is operating as it should and that 
policies, procedures and controls adopted are adequate, and their effectiveness 
is validated in reducing errors and risks.
Monitoring is the programme manager’s responsibility. This is the person most 
familiar with their own operations and they should be charged with identifying 
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risk areas which are their responsibility, developing appropriate internal controls, 
policies and procedures, and monitoring them to verify they are being followed. 
Auditing of these operations needs to be performed by parties independent of 
these operations. This will ensure objectivity in performing the audit reviews. 
Why monitoring and auditing is an important safety process
It can be argued that many of the major unplanned explosions at munitions sites 37) 
are a result of poor compliance with safety procedures and that they might not have 
occurred if the sites had been subject to rigorous monitoring and audit. It seems 
to be self-evident that if a stockpile is deteriorating and that this is discovered in an 
audit of procedures or inspection of the site, then action to reduce or eliminate the 
risk from the deteriorating stock can be taken.
IATG 06.70 38) – Inspection of explosives facilities - explains the rationale behind the 
requirement for a thorough inspection regime in explosives areas and recommended 
procedures. It is imperative that all aspects of the explosives licence, and the 
national authority explosives regulatory regime, are being complied with and that 
explosives facilities are fit for purpose. Compliance with the terms of the explosives 
licence should be a mandatory requirement with exceptions approved only by the 
national authority. 
The national standards for monitoring and auditing of ammunition and explosives- 
related activities should explain the role(s) of the national authority and inspectorate 
units, their chain of authority and links to the legislature, any links to law enforcement 
agencies, any cross-governmental responsibilities, and any links to international 
organizations or groups. The national standards should also include detail of how 
licences for storage, use, processing, movement and disposal of ammunition and 
explosives will be submitted, approved, monitored and audited. The national standards 
will, out of necessity, also remind users of the sanctions available to the legislature 
and national authority for non-compliance. 
4.3  NATIONAL STANDARDS AS PART OF CAPACITY AND  
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
The acts of drafting, approving, implementing and ensuring compliance with one’s 
own national standards encourages understanding. The States which introduce 
and/or enact their own national standards are likely to make better use of them than 
States trying to enact similar national standards from elsewhere, if only because 
they can say “these are our rules”. 
Capacity development is the process by which individuals, groups and organizations, 
institutions and States develop, enhance and organize their systems, resources and 
knowledge ; all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to perform 
functions, solve problems and achieve objectives. 
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A national authority demonstrates its understanding of the activities it undertakes 
through the documents it produces. High-quality, detailed but understandable 
national standards are important to the users and of great interest to potential 
international and regional partners. 
The Australian Department of Defence defines capability development 39) as “the 
capacity or ability to achieve an operational effect. An operational effect may be 
defined or described in terms of the nature of the effect and of how, when, where 
and for how long it is produced.” The operational effect that is delivered in this case 
is a stockpile of ammunition and explosives that is not only safe and secure but 
sustainable and ready for use at all times.
4.4  ROLES FOR NATIONAL MANAGEMENT, OPERATING AND  
AUDITING BODIES
One of the national standards should describe the State’s governance structure for 
the safe and secure management of ammunition and explosives. No doubt some 
or all of this will be included in legislation/regulations but the national standards should 
provide the user with an understanding of how they fit into the structure.
Legislature
In the context of ammunition and explosives safety management, the role of the 
legislature is to pass laws for the manufacture, storage, processing, movement, 
testing, use and disposal of ammunition and explosives. The legislature typically :
• Drafts and enacts ammunition and explosives safety and security legislation ;
• Ensures that national standards comply with the legislation before approval 
for use ;
• Supported by advice from the national authority, publishes the national action plan 
or ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy based on internationally 
accepted good practice ;
• Provides the necessary resources to achieve the aims and milestones of the 
ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy.
The IATG provide technical guidance on how the manufacture, storage, processing, 
movement, testing, use and disposal of ammunition and explosives is conducted 
in practice but the laws need to be written such that they include other details such 
as who can be licenced to handle explosive substances and articles, where and 
how these licences are issued, and who will enforce the laws and sanctions for 
those who break the laws. The State might need to acquire land on which to build 
ammunition and explosives facilities, and to safeguard land surrounding explosives 
facilities from encroachment by building developments, all of which will require 
appropriate legislation.
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National authority
IATG 01.40 defines the national authority as “the government department(s), organ-
isation(s) or institution(s) charged with the regulation, management, co-ordination 
and operation of conventional ammunition stockpile management activities”. It is 
good practice to separate the regulatory body from the operational organization(s) 
as can be seen from the following sections. The national authority :
• Drafts and implements national standards ;
• Advises the legislature on the scope and scale of the ammunition and explosives 
issues to be addressed ;
• Advises the legislature on which internationally accepted good practices are in the 
best interest of the State and the resources necessary to achieve the aims of the 
national action plan or ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy ;
• Audits the operating bodies, be they government or civil entities, to provide 
assurance to the legislature of the degree of compliance with the national standards, 
to identify gaps and advise on short- to medium-term goals to fill any gaps.
Regulatory body
The primary goal for a regulatory body is to protect the public, such as providing 
and enforcing adequate standards for health and safety in an organization. Unlike 
professional organizations, which require regulating, a regulatory body is created 
on the basis of a legal mandate or legislation. These regulatory bodies are funded 
by levies taken from their professions and have their own staff and premises. 
Examples of explosives regulatory bodies are the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board 
(DDESB), and the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Defence Safety 
Authority (DSA).
Operational organization
Some States appoint one or more department(s) of State to be the only organization 
that can manage the safe and secure handling and use of ammunition and explosives. 
Others allow commercial organizations to do this. Whichever model or self-designed 
construct is used, the role of an operational ammunition and explosives organization 
is to conduct all its activities within the law.
The government and/or civil ammunition and explosives operators such as depots, 
disposal and demilitarization facilities, manufacturers, companies and quarries :
• Draft and implement standing operating procedures (SOPs) that direct their staff 
and guide their work in conformity to the national standards ;
• Conduct their activities and maintain records as required by the national standards ;
• Provide reports to the national authority and prepare to be audited as required.
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Auditing organization
As the regulator, the national authority is expected to have an organization within 
its structure that carries out audits of ammunition and explosives facilities. The role 
of this “inspectorate” is captured in the description of an ammunition inspector in 
IATG 01.90 40) to “…audit the policy and technical instructions for all aspects of the 
stockpile management of ammunition and explosive substances and articles”. This 
will involve inspectors visiting facilities, observing all the activities that are undertaken 
there, completing an RRPL checklist, making note of all good and poor practices, 
reporting on his/her findings to the national authority and taking appropriate actions.
In States with large security forces, it is not uncommon for the operational organiza-
tion(s) to have its own auditing body or individuals with an audit function on the staff 
of explosives facilities. Their role is to provide the commander of a facility or the 
head of the operational organization with assurance that they are compliant with all 
relevant regulations. This explosives safety representative is usually an experienced 
ammunition manager or ammunition inspector who is not employed in the day-to-day 
activities of the facility and who reports directly to the head/commander.
05
CONCLUSION
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By developing its own set of standards, a national authority will gain greater under-
standing of all aspects of ammunition management. The application of good practice 
from the IATG and other relevant guidance to national standards will enhance 
the knowledge of the authors of these standards. This local understanding and 
knowledge are essential in the capacity development of the State’s ability to manage 
its own ammunition in the long-term.
As described in Chapter 3, States should not attempt to achieve risk reduction to 
RRPL 3 immediately. Instead, an assessment of the current situation should be 
completed and then a risk assessment carried out. The national standards should 
reflect the outcome of these assessments and describe a realistic approach to the 
safe and secure management of ammunition with the assets available currently 
and in the future, with a natural progression through RRPL 1 and RRPL 2.
To be effective, the national standards will need to take into account the current state 
of ammunition and available resources. Competent implementation of adequate 
national standards will enable a State to attain the goal of safe and secure management 
of ammunition. This guide and the IATG will assist the national authority in achieving 
this goal.
The national authority responsible for management of the national ammunition 
and explosives stockpile is best placed to deliver national standards. It will have 
the relevant competencies to be able to adapt the IATG to national requirements. 
The national action plan or strategy will specify if the State will adopt the IATG as 
its basis for compliance with international norms. 
The IATG and other international norms recognize the absolute right of States to 
legislate for the safety and security of their people. Only at the national level can 
the scope and scale of ammunition and explosives safety and security issues be 
addressed. For it is at this level that the State-specific political, economic, cultural, 
educational, security and structural issues of the management of military and civil 
explosives stockpiles can be identified. 
National standards will embrace not only the technical aspects of stockpile management 
but also the legal framework within which authorization to manufacture, acquire, 
keep, process, use and dispose of ammunition and explosives is managed, along 
with the range of sanctions for non-compliance.
The establishment of effective and well-coordinated national standards is a 
concrete signal that ammunition management is nationally owned. 
| 52
05
 —
 C
on
cl
us
io
n
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DESCRIPTIONS
National authority The government department(s), organisation(s) or 
institution(s) charged with the regulation, management, 
coordination and operation of ammunition stockpile 
management activities. 
IATG 01.40
National standard A documented agreement containing technical 
specifications or other precise criteria to be used 
consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of 
characteristics to ensure that materials, products, 
processes and services are fit for their purpose. 
A national standard therefore brings together the 
technical, legislative and regulatory requirements of 
the State into a set of nationally accepted norms that 
are available to, understood by, and achievable (within 
accepted boundaries) by all those affected.
IATG 01.40
Standing 
operating 
procedure (SOP)
Instructions that define the preferred or currently 
established method of conducting an operational task 
or activity, noting that their purpose is to promote 
recognisable and measurable degrees of discipline, 
uniformity, consistency and commonality within an 
organisation, with the aim of improving operational 
effectiveness and safety. SOPs should reflect local 
requirements and circumstances.
IATG 01.40
Risk Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm 
and the severity of that harm. 
IATG 01.40
Risk analysis Systematic use of available information to identify 
hazards and to estimate the risk.
IATG 01.40
Risk assessment The overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk 
evaluation. The objective evaluation of risk in a manner 
in which assumptions and uncertainties are clearly 
considered and presented.
IATG 01.40
Risk management The complete risk-based decision-making process. IATG 01.40
Risk reduction Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative 
consequences or both, associated with a particular risk.
IATG 01.40
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Risk reduction 
process level 1
Basic safety precautions are in place to reduce the risk 
of undesirable explosive events during ammunition 
storage, but fatalities and injuries to individuals in local 
civilian communities may still occur.
IATG 01.40
Risk reduction 
process level 2
Safety precautions, in the form of appropriate separation 
and quantity distances, have been implemented to 
reduce the risk of fatalities and injuries to individuals 
within local communities to a tolerable level.
IATG 01.40
Risk reduction 
process level 3
A safe, secure, effective and efficient conventional 
ammunition stockpile management system is in place 
that is fully in line with international best practices.
IATG 01.40
ATTACHMENTS
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ANNEX I : BRIEF SUMMARIES OF IATG MODULES
This table briefly summarizes the 45 modules in the 12 thematic IATG volumes, to 
assist the development of national standards. 41)
Table 4 – Brief summaries of IATG modules to assist the development of national standards
IATG Volume 01 – Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
Module 01.10
Guide to the 
International 
Ammunition 
Technical 
Guidelines 
(IATG)
This module introduces the six activity groups that encompass conventional 
ammunition stockpile management and identifies four guiding principles of the IATG :
• the right of national governments to apply national standards to their national stockpile ;
• the need to protect those most at risk from unintended explosive events ;
• the requirement to build a national capacity to develop, maintain and apply 
appropriate standards for stockpile management ; and 
• the need to maintain consistency and compliance with other international norms, 
conventions and agreements. 
By applying the IATG risk management process in line with their capabilities and 
resources, States and other users are expected to secure immediate reductions 
in ammunition-related risk. More broadly, use of the IATG is designed to ensure 
consistency with international guidelines and compliance with relevant international 
regulations, conventions and treaties.
Module 01.20
Index of risk 
reduction 
process levels 
(RRPL) within 
IATG
The RRPLs lie at the heart of the IATG risk management process. Each required task 
and activity is assigned to one of three possible levels. As the level number increases, 
the risks decrease accordingly. Under RRPL 1, basic stockpile safety and security 
precautions are in place and a minimal investment of resources is required. The risk 
of unplanned explosions at munitions site (UEMS) remains, as does the concomitant 
likelihood of fatalities and injuries. RRPL 2 is an improvement on RRPL 1 and requires 
medium-level investment. The risk of UEMS remains, but the likelihood of fatalities and 
injuries is reduced due to the use of basic separation distances. RRPL 3 requires the 
greatest investment. The result is a relatively safe, secure and efficient stockpile that is 
consistent with international best practice. States that adopt the IATG risk management 
structure are able to develop, manage and monitor their own efforts towards achieving 
self-assigned RRPL goals. Using the tables presented in this module, a State can design 
its own comprehensive plan for achieving IATG compliance.
Module 01.30
Policy 
development 
and advice
A comprehensive national ammunition management programme that ensures the 
safe and secure storage of ammunition requires top-level support for State policies 
that specify requirements for the system. Before policies can be established, policy 
developers and decision makers must gain an understanding of the overarching 
philosophy and principles of safe, effective, and efficient ammunition storage, as 
well as the associated challenges. International agreements may have an impact on 
national policy and direction, and stockpile management.
This module is designed to assist States as they develop strategic ammunition 
management policy and requirements. It outlines important functional areas that need 
to be addressed by policy-makers and relevant organizations at all levels of national 
planning and operational activities. Efficient stockpile management ensures the best 
“value for money” from ammunition. Stockpile management is an effective mechanism 
for reducing security risks associated with loss, theft, leakage and proliferation.
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IATG Volume 01 – Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
Module 01.40 
Glossary 
of terms, 
definitions and 
abbreviations
The IATG draw on a variety of international sources. To ensure a common understanding 
and consistency in interpretation and application, this module defines all key terms that are 
used in the IATG modules. In addition, it explains the top–down approach that was taken by 
the IATG drafting team in developing the IATG terms and definitions.
Module 01.50
UN explosive 
hazard 
classification 
system and 
codes
The development of appropriate ammunition safety requirements calls for an 
understanding of the risks associated with each individual ammunition item. In 
general, a technical authority in the State where the ammunition is produced assigns 
an item’s dangerous goods classification, using prescribed UN testing and assessment 
protocols. The classification identifies the item’s hazard class, division, and storage 
compatibility code, all of which are necessary for shipping and storage purposes. 
With rare exceptions, purchased and shipped ammunition should be classified in 
accordance with the UN protocols described in this module. For storage purposes and 
to ensure the proper application of quantity distances, a relevant technical authority 
may need to assign ammunition to a storage subdivision and to further classify its 
predominant hazardous effects. Since the IATG risk management process and its 
safety requirements are based on UN hazard classifications, it is important for users 
to have a basic understanding of what these are, how they are derived, and how they 
should be applied.
This module introduces and explains the UN system and related codes, identifies 
the tests that are performed to determine an appropriate hazard classification, and 
discusses the mixing of ammunition with different compatibility groups. It also 
covers the assignment of an appropriate storage subdivision when relevant. National 
authorities can ensure the proper application of IATG requirements once they have 
integrated the UN hazard classification system into their through-life management 
processes.
Module 01.60
Ammunition 
faults and 
performance 
failures
Despite efforts to promote stockpile safety, UEMS may still occur. Most of these 
events are preventable, however, and their impact can be reduced significantly if 
preventive LCMA safety measures are undertaken. 
This module outlines what steps to take in the case of ammunition faults or 
performance failures. It explains the importance and benefits of reporting such 
problems, investigating them thoroughly, and taking prompt corrective action to 
prevent them from reoccurring.
The ability to manage ammunition faults and performance failures is an important 
part of ensuring the safety and security of a national stockpile. This module advises 
authorities on how to develop a national process for reporting, investigating, correcting 
and managing these failures.
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IATG Volume 01 – Introduction and Principles of Ammunition Management
Module 01.70
Bans and 
constraints
States should never permit the storage or use of ammunition that is dangerous or 
unsafe. Similarly, they should not use ammunition that does not meet minimum 
performance requirements or is in short supply.
This module provides guidance on the establishment of a formal system of bans and 
constraints. It also covers their application to ammunition use, storage, handling, 
transportation and disposal. It explains why bans and constraints might be used, how to 
manage them, and how to make sure all relevant parties are aware of their existence and 
abide by them. The ability to manage ammunition bans and constraints is an important 
part of the through-life management of ammunition. This module helps authorities to 
develop a national process for establishing, implementing and managing them.
Module 01.80
Formulae for 
ammunition 
management
Module 01.50 explains the UN hazard classification system and codes in the context of 
IATG risk management and safety requirements. It helps users to understand the hazardous 
effects of ammunition and explosives, as well as how to protect against them.
The type and extent of hazardous effects associated with UEMS is related to the kind 
and quantity of ammunition and explosives involved in an incident, as well as the 
location in which it occurs. Proper risk management calls for a solid understanding of 
all possible hazards.
This module is designed for technical officials who require an understanding of the 
effects and consequences of explosives and who need to undertake risk assessments, 
which are an RRPL 1 requirement. Risk assessments help to identify the potential impact 
of an unexpected event on surrounding areas and personnel. When minimum IATG 
separation distances cannot be met, risk assessments and risk analyses are also RRPL 
2 and RRPL 3 requirements (see Module 2.20). By understanding hazardous effects, 
technical experts will be better able to advise decision makers on available options for 
reducing, preventing and even eliminating risk.
Module 01.90
Ammunition 
management 
personnel 
competences
To assure the safety and security of a State’s ammunition stockpile, personnel charged 
with handling and managing ammunition must be properly trained and demonstrate 
minimum competency levels. As there are no international standards on the skill 
sets required for proper ammunition and risk management, this module provides an 
overview of the required basic competencies. It is focused on RRPL 2 and RRPL 3 of the 
IATG requirements.
The module describes three areas that are associated with personnel competencies : 
behavioural traits, technical skills, and the achievement of targets and objectives. It 
also identifies seven generic categories of ammunition-related personnel and explains 
how to assess an individual’s competency to perform assigned tasks. For each of the 
generic personnel categories, detailed annexes identify roles and responsibilities, 
competencies and IATG tasks for which personnel must be able to demonstrate 
proficiency. Ensuring that personnel are properly trained and competent is an important 
part of Through Life Management. This module assists authorities in developing a 
national training and competency programme for personnel involved in ammunition-
related tasks and their management.
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IATG Volume 02 – Risk Management
Module 02.10
Introduction 
to risk 
management 
principles and 
processes
Based on their resources and capacities, States take various approaches to risk 
management, ranging from basic to extremely complex. For those with limited 
resources, capacity and capabilities, even simple risk management techniques and 
tools can help to identify risks related to UEMS so that decision makers clearly 
understand the risks they are accepting and the consequences of their decisions.
Implementation of a robust, effective and integrated risk management process for 
achieving an “acceptable” risk level for ammunition-related activities should be a 
fundamental part of a State’s through-life management process.
This module discusses the concept, principles, activities, and techniques pertaining to 
risk management of ammunition storage, as well as available IATG tools (provided by 
SaferGuard) to support risk management efforts. Adherence to IATG requirements calls 
for the implementation of many components of an integrated risk management system. 
Although this module is primarily focused on risks to the local civilian population, it 
provides information that can be used to address risks involving all functional areas 
of ammunition stockpile management. The module describes straightforward risk 
assessment techniques that can be used in a wide range of circumstances. It also 
provides references for more complex risk assessment and analysis.
Module 02.20
Quantity and 
separation 
distances
The use of separation distance - that is, quantity distance as detailed in this module 
- is the most effective way to protect people and structures from the impact of UEMS, 
which can produce weapon fragments, thermal radiation and structural debris. Under 
ideal circumstances, a safe separation distance is determined and applied. In practice, 
this step is often skipped due to a lack of resources or capacity ; in such cases, 
authorities make do with a distance that ensures an “acceptable” level of risk.
This module underscores the importance and value of complying with IATG 
requirements in determining minimum quantity distances from potential explosion 
sites. It provides pre-determined distances that are based on the exposed site, 
ammunition type and quantity, and storage sites - in the open air or within a structure.
Module 02.30
Licensing of 
explosives 
facilities
This module addresses licensing of explosives facilities. It identifies issuing 
authorities, the various types of licences, the minimum content of such licences, 
and related management and oversight responsibilities to ensure that licensing 
requirements are met. The explosives allowance specified in a licence should be 
based on the results of a risk assessment or analysis and associated risk management 
decisions (see Module 02.10), by use of the quantity distance tables (see Module 
02.20), and/or an approved site plan (see Module 05.10). The guidance provided in this 
module can assist authorities in developing a national licensing system for ammunition 
facilities and their management.
The safety distances and the net explosive quantity described in Module 02.20 are 
recorded on an explosive limit licence (ELL) for each explosive storehouse or facility.
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IATG Volume 02 – Risk Management
Module 02.40
Safeguarding 
of explosives 
facilities
A guiding IATG principle is that national authorities have a responsibility to protect 
those most at risk from UEMS (see Module 01.10). One of the most effective ways of 
protecting the public from such an event is by using the quantity distances provided in 
Module 02.20.
All too often, these quantity distances extend beyond the boundaries of ammunition 
sites, including into areas that are not under the control of national authorities, such 
as private property. The process for managing, protecting, and restricting the use 
of such land is called “safeguarding”. In the absence of a system for safeguarding 
land located within designated boundaries, the public can be at risk. Such cases 
contravene approved quantity distances or decisions on an “acceptable” level of risk 
from explosives facilities (Module 02.10). A lack of safeguarding can have a significant 
impact on public safety as well as a State’s ammunition capabilities and its stockpile.
This module discusses the concept of safeguarding and provides an approach for 
establishing, implementing and managing a safeguarding system. Authorities can use 
this guidance to develop policy and requirements for safeguarding land surrounding 
ammunition stockpiles.
Module 02.50
Fire safety
Fire presents a significant threat to ammunition stockpiles and is probably the most 
common cause of UEMS. In view of the inherent risks associated with ammunition, fire 
presents an immediate and high risk to life and property surrounding a stockpile.
For this reason, an aggressive and comprehensive fire prevention programme is 
essential to minimize the risk of fires in or near ammunition storage facilities. In 
addition, trained personnel, response processes and equipment for fighting fires must 
be in place and readily available. Once a fire gets out of control and ammunition begins 
to react, the evacuation of all personnel to a safe distance is generally required.
This module addresses the elements of a good fire safety and prevention programme 
for explosives facilities. It also outlines the basic principles underpinning firefighting 
in such facilities and provides guidance on firefighting equipment, systems and 
procedures. It is not intended to help design firefighting systems or responses, as these 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
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IATG Volume 03 – Ammunition Accounting
Module 03.10
Inventory 
management
Ammunition has a shelf life that is finite and controlled by a number of internal and 
external factors. Unmanaged and unmonitored ammunition can be stolen, damaged 
or misused and can deteriorate to a point where it reacts in an unintended manner. 
To protect such a valuable commodity and provide a safe and secure environment, a 
State must be able to account for – and effectively manage – its ammunition as part 
of an inventory management system. This module details the basic elements of such a 
system and how to incorporate it into an ammunition management programme. Failure 
to provide basic inventory management is almost a guarantee that ammunition will fail 
to function as designed, will become unsafe, or will be diverted.
An inventory management process can help a State to meet the IATG guiding principles 
by ensuring that only ammunition that is serviceable and safe to use is issued and thus 
protect the civilian population from hazards associated with unsafe ammunition (see 
Module 01.10). An effective inventory management system allows a state to identify 
inventory issues – including inaccuracy, loss, theft and unsafe ammunition in the 
national stockpile – and is an essential part of through-life management.
Module 03.20
Lotting and 
batching
Tracking lot and batch numbers on ammunition as part of the inventory management 
process supports a State’s efforts towards efficient ammunition management. Lotting 
and batching distinguishes like stockpile items that were manufactured at the same 
time using the same or similar materials and processes, meaning that they are 
generally expected to have the same performance capacity and properties throughout 
their lifetime.
This module introduces the concept of lotting and batching, describes when lot and 
batch numbers should be used, how they are assigned, and what information can be 
derived from a lot or batch number. It also addresses the importance of knowing and 
tracking ammunition locations by lot and batch numbers. A primary benefit of recording 
and tracking such information, as well as ammunition locations (by lot and batch), is 
the ability to identify and locate unsafe or suspect ammunition so that appropriate 
action can be taken to manage risk (see Module 01.70).
Accounting for lotting and batching information as part of the national ammunition 
inventory management system is important for proper stockpile accounting and 
through-life management. These processes improve a State’s ability to keep 
ammunition safe and secure.
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IATG Volume 03 – Ammunition Accounting
Module 03.30
International 
transfer of 
ammunition 
module
This module provides guidance on the development and implementation of effective 
national controls over international ammunition transfers, including the import, export, 
transit, transshipment and brokering of ammunition. It also addresses issues related 
to the transfer of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), the enforcement 
of controls, international cooperation and assistance, and public and parliamentary 
transparency. This module is of particular relevance to States that are significant 
exporters or importers of ammunition but that have little involvement in other aspects 
of the international arms trade. The module may also be of interest to legislators, 
ammunition manufacturers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other 
stakeholders working to improve controls.
The module focuses on assisting government personnel, UN officials, and staff from 
other international and regional organizations that are developing and implementing 
ammunition transfer controls. It covers the development and strengthening of national 
controls to help prevent transfers that fuel armed conflict, abuses of human rights or 
violations of international humanitarian law, or risk being excessive or destabilizing 
to the recipient country. It also offers advice concerning the development of effective 
national measures to prosecute individuals who breach ammunition transfer norms.
Module 03.40
End-user and 
end-use of 
internationally 
transferred 
ammunition
module
This module provides guidance for the development and implementation of effective 
national controls over the end-users and end-uses of internationally transferred 
ammunition, specifically in order to prevent and combat its diversion from the legal 
market into the illicit sphere. Other aspects of the international transfer of ammunition 
are covered in Module 03.30.
This module covers legislative and other processes that can be used to control the end-
users and end-uses, including the assessment of diversion risks at the licensing stage ; 
the establishment and use of end-use documentation ; the authentication and verification 
of end-use documentation ; and post-delivery monitoring of transferred ammunition. It 
also addresses enforcement mechanisms and international cooperation and assistance. 
The primary targets of this module are national authorities responsible for devising and 
implementing ammunition transfer controls. This module is also relevant to legislators, 
ammunition manufacturers, NGOs and other stakeholders working to improve controls. 
National controls of end-users and end-uses are part of a comprehensive system that 
encompasses all aspects of ammunition transfer. The basic characteristics of such a 
system are : legislation or a regulatory framework ; procedures for the assessment of 
diversion risks at the licensing stage ; end-user authentication ; verification measures 
before, during, and after the transfer ; and enforcement mechanisms.
Module 03.50
Tracing of 
ammunition
This module aims to build national capacity for the tracing of ammunition in order 
to identify and disrupt sources of illicit trade linked to armed conflict and criminal 
activity. Illicit ammunition - which tends to enter the illicit sphere following legal 
manufacture - fuels conflict and crime. Ammunition components are commonly used to 
produce improvised explosive devices. Tracing is used to determine the point at which 
ammunition was diverted or became illicit. It involves the systematic tracking of items 
from the point of manufacture or import, through the supply chain, to the last legal owner. 
Lotting and batching help to ensure that ammunition is traceable (see Module 03.20).
This module covers areas such as the introduction of national points of contact, the 
establishment of a national tracing system, domestic and international tracing operations, 
responses to international tracing requests, and international cooperation and assistance, 
including the roles of INTERPOL, the UN, regional organizations and NGOs.
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IATG Volume 04 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Field and Temporary Conditions)
Module 04.10
Field storage
During military operations, there is often a need to store ammunition in the field 
(“open storage”) if proper storage facilities are unavailable at deployment locations. 
Ammunition in open storage can be kept safely, effectively and efficiently as long as 
certain safety challenges are resolved.
This module addresses open storage of ammunition for periods of up to one year 
in support of military operations, describes the challenges associated with such 
“short-term” storage, and details specific requirements for managing and monitoring 
the ammunition. Open storage is associated with significant safety concerns, 
including the deteriorating effect of exposure to wind, water, sun, heat, humidity, 
sand and dust, as well as the possibility that the service life of ammunition may be 
significantly reduced by exposure. A surveillance and in-service test programme is 
required to ensure that ammunition performance and safety are not compromised 
during, or as a result of, short-term open storage (see Module 07.20). This module 
assumes that deployment activities will end within one year and that ammunition 
deemed safe for transport will be returned to its originating State. Module 04.20 
provides guidance for deployments that exceed one year and involve long-term open 
storage of ammunition.
Module 04.20
Temporary 
storage
Long-term open storage may be required for up to five years if appropriate depot 
storage infrastructure is not available, or if available infrastructure cannot offer the 
necessary protection from the elements. This module assumes that the situation 
that led to the need for long-term open storage will be eliminated or resolved within 
five years, either because appropriate new infrastructure will become available or 
because the ammunition will have been used, relocated or demilitarized. Even under 
long-term open storage, it is possible for ammunition to be stored safely, effectively 
and efficiently, as long as significant safety and security challenges are resolved.
This module describes these challenges and details specific requirements for 
managing and monitoring ammunition in this environment. Concerns regarding 
safety and reliability are further amplified for long-term open storage due to the 
increased exposure time. An effective surveillance and in-service test programme 
is the only way to ensure that ammunition performance and safety are not 
compromised during, or as a result of, long-term open storage (see Module 07.20).
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IATG Volume 05 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)
Module 05.10
Planning 
and siting of 
explosives 
facilities
UEMS can have extremely dangerous effects on the surrounding area. Authorities 
must consider these potential effects as early as possible in the planning and design 
of an explosives facility of any size or capacity. They also need to factor them into 
their assessments of protection needs around these facilities, such as in relation to 
the public, roads, buildings or other storage facilities.
Every existing or planned explosives facility must be carefully considered and 
evaluated to ensure that minimum quantity distances are applied (see Module 
02.20). Whenever these cannot be applied, appropriate risk assessment and 
risk acceptance steps must be taken (see Module 02.10). These actions can be 
accomplished through the establishment of a formal national process to assess, 
site, and approve all existing and planned explosives facilities. The primary purpose 
of this process is to verify that each established and planned ammunition storage 
location meets IATG requirements in addition to providing minimum protection levels 
within quantity distances (see Module 02.20).
This module details general requirements and procedures for planning, siting and 
approving planned and existing explosives facilities and for managing construction 
within quantity distances of these facilities.
Module 05.20
Types of buildings 
for explosives 
facilities
Many different types of buildings are used for the storage and handling of 
ammunition, but - from a safety or risk perspective - not all are appropriate for 
the ammunition-related activities conducted in them. The consequences of using 
unsuitable buildings can be serious. When planning the construction of a new 
explosives facility, decision makers should consider a number of different building 
types and aspects of building construction.
This module details the general requirements for the design of explosives facilities. 
It discusses the effects of unplanned events, the hazards they introduce, the concept 
of explosives propagation (that is, a detonation reaction in which one ammunition 
stack causes the immediate detonation reaction of an adjacent stack), and the 
importance of protecting against the detonation of an adjacent stack in order to 
limit the size of any unplanned event. The module provides guidance on the types of 
buildings to be used as explosives facilities ; possible scenarios and effects resulting 
from unplanned events and how different types of buildings respond to such 
events ; design considerations ; and the optimization of explosives facility design 
with quantity distances. Explosives facilities are a hazard to personnel, the public, 
surrounding facilities and other exposed locations. Appropriate building design, 
construction and siting are of crucial importance in the application of IATG quantity 
distances, as detailed in Module 02.20.
Module 05.30
Traverses and 
barricades
A properly constructed barricade around an explosives facility is an extremely 
effective mitigation technique for intercepting low-angle fragments and debris 
resulting from an unplanned explosion. It is important to properly assess the 
placement of barricades so that they are constructed where they provide the most 
beneficial protection and are most cost-effective.
This module addresses the issues of barricade selection, design, construction and 
siting, and only applies to barricades used in permanent explosive storage facilities. 
Temporary barricades used as part of open storage are addressed in Modules 04.10 
and 04.20.
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IATG Volume 05 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)
Module 05.40
Safety standards 
for electrical 
installations
The control of electrical and lightning-related hazards in explosives facilities is 
important because of the potential for transient electrical signals and surges, 
arcing, static discharge and lightning strikes, as well as associated fires. Control 
measures for these hazards can vary significantly, depending on the ammunition-
related operations being performed and the facility involved. Some measures 
may be very simple while others may require complex, integrated systems that 
must be collectively considered as part of the design of the building’s electrical, 
grounding, bonding and lightning protection systems, as well as their installation 
and maintenance. A primary technique for managing electrical risks within an 
explosives facility is categorizing the facility by electrical hazard codes and zones. 
Such categories further define the levels of protection that are required to prevent an 
unplanned event.
This module helps users to understand the electrical hazard categorization process, 
as well as the protection systems that may be required to manage various electrical 
threats. It also details the requirements and standards for these systems, including 
testing, to demonstrate system effectiveness.
Module 05.50
Vehicles and 
mechanical 
handling 
equipment (MHE) 
in explosives 
facilities
In the context of ammunition-related operations, unsuitable vehicles and mechanical 
handling equipment can present a fire or explosion risk. Vehicles and equipment, as 
well as ancillary items, should comply with the facility’s or area’s assigned electrical 
hazard categorization codes and zones (see Module 05.40).
This module addresses a broad range of vehicles and MHE that might be used in 
ammunition-related operations and provides corresponding risk reduction measures. 
It also reviews requirements for a management and control process for vehicle 
equipment design, modification, selection, approval, labeling, use, maintenance 
and testing – to ensure the process is appropriate for all intended uses and that it is 
kept current with applicable standards. Compliance with this module ensures that 
vehicles and MHE used to support ammunition-related operations are appropriate 
and safe for their intended use and environment, thereby reducing risk.
Module 05.60
Radio frequency 
hazards
Technological advances have resulted in the increased use of communications 
equipment operating on a host of different radio frequencies, as well as power 
outputs such as data loggers, mobile phones, pagers, two-way radios (hand-held, 
permanent, or vehicle-mounted) and high-power transmitters. This equipment 
generates electromagnetic radiation energy ; if improperly used in the proximity of 
susceptible ammunition, the energy from an inadvertent transmission may cause 
an unplanned event or the degradation of an electronic system. The energy can 
also lead to arcing or sparking, both of which are potential fire hazards. These 
threats point to the need to consider, control and manage the use of electronic 
communications equipment in the proximity of ammunition throughout the through-
life management process.
This module explains why electromagnetic radiation energy is a hazard that needs 
to be addressed as part of ammunition management, and details basic precautions 
that can be taken. It provides guidance on the requirements for developing a technical 
national authority and statutory regulations, in addition to establishing an assessment 
and approval process for the use of electronic communications equipment and 
transmitters. Compliance with this module addresses a critical safety issue and helps 
prevent UEMS related to uncontrolled electromagnetic radiation energy.
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IATG Volume 06 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Operations)
Module 06.10
Control of 
explosives 
facilities
The safe and efficient management of explosives facilities or operations - with their 
myriad hazards - entails the consideration of areas such as personnel training and 
qualifications, security and access controls, fire protection, real estate management 
and site planning, electronic equipment for communications, facilities and licensing. 
From a safety and security perspective, managers, supervisors and ammunition-
related personnel should prioritize the management and control of activities 
associated with the above areas.
This module introduces the basic principles for managing explosives operations. It 
lists the elements of a good control and management programme, identifying what 
is important about each and providing the requirements for the routine control of 
ammunition-related activities. The module covers some technical issues including 
radio-frequency energy produced by transmitters, MHE, and electrical installations. 
It cites references to other modules that have been developed to help manage these 
areas.
Module 06.20
Storage space 
requirements
Both ammunition and storage facilities are expensive and should be managed 
not only to maximize storage facility use, but also to place as much ammunition 
as possible in the protective spaces of storage facilities. As Modules 04.10 and 
04.20 indicate, covered storage is preferable to open storage for the protection 
of ammunition from the potentially damaging effects of environmental and other 
exposure.
This module helps users to plan for and optimize ammunition storage, thereby 
ensuring maximum cost efficiency and effective storage planning. It encourages 
the full use of available units of space in covered storage to reduce the need for 
open storage. Explosives limits must not be exceeded in any storage facility. This 
module provides guidance on storage space planning, taking into consideration the 
allowable explosives limits of storage facilities. This module is designed to help 
users align their storage facility space requirements more closely with their available 
stockpile needs, towards safer and more effective storage of ammunition.
Module 06.30
Storage and 
handling
Improper storage and handling of ammunition increases the potential for damage, 
which may negatively impact its reliability and safety, or lead to UEMS. Damaged 
ammunition has to be either repaired or destroyed and then replaced, which may 
result in significant financial cost. The protection of ammunition from such damage is 
one of the controls discussed in Module 06.10.
This module provides an overview of general practical considerations and 
requirements for the safe storage and handling of ammunition in facilities and for 
inter-facility transportation. It references related modules, all of which provide 
additional guidance and requirements for important aspects of safe ammunition 
storage, processing and transport.
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IATG Volume 06 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Operations)
Module 06.40
Ammunition 
packaging and 
marking
The correct packaging of ammunition – which is designed and tested to demonstrate 
that it provides the required protection throughout its service life – is a key safety 
measure. Packaging is also designed to assist the processes of ammunition 
movement, storage and handling. The removal of ammunition from its approved 
packaging exposes it to damage and other potential hazards, such as environmental 
effects, insects, dirt and electromagnetic energy, which can have a serious impact 
on its safety and reliability. For this reason, ammunition should always be kept in its 
approved packaging until needed. In addition, taking ammunition out of UN-approved 
shipping packaging can affect its hazard classification. Changes in classification 
must be accounted for as part of the management of explosives facilities (see 
Module 06.10). The UN hazard classification system is detailed in Module 01.50.
Proper markings, labels and seals on ammunition and packaging communicate 
critical safety and security information, allowing for proper storage, handling and 
transport of ammunition. Some are required by the UN hazard classification system, 
while others support management and control processes in facilities, as discussed in 
this module and Module 06.10. This module provides general, practical information 
and basic requirements related to ammunition packaging and its markings, with the 
aim of raising user awareness of the many considerations involved.
Module 06.50
Specific safety 
precautions 
(storage and 
operations)
The chemicals that are used to manufacture ammunition are generally hazardous. 
They are toxic to humans, posing health risks through inhalation, ingestion and 
absorption through both the skin and the eyes. Some ammunition items require 
additional safety considerations because they present unique risks. These must be 
considered and incorporated into management and control processes in explosives 
facilities (see Module 06.10).
The purpose of this module is to highlight additional safety precautions, basic 
requirements, and mitigation factors for ammunition in general, as well as for unique 
ammunition items and component materials, such as :
• ammunition filled with dangerous substances, such as white or red phosphorus, 
which, if cracked or damaged, can leak and upon contact with air spontaneously 
ignite ;
• phosphide-filled ammunition, which is activated by water and, if cracked or 
damaged, can interact with water in any state and produce toxic and flammable 
phosphine gas ;
• finely divided powdered metals (in bulk and in ammunition), which can generate 
hydrogen gas upon contact with water and form an explosive hydrogen/air 
mixture ;
• ammunition or components recovered through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 
such as unexploded ordnance ;
• ammunition for museums, souvenirs, displays and training aids, or surplus 
products and salvageable leftover materials from manufacturing, demilitarization 
or other similar processes.
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IATG Volume 06 – Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Operations)
Module 06.60
Works services 
(construction and 
repair)
Contract personnel working in an area where explosives are stored, processed or 
transported must be properly managed and monitored for their own safety and 
the safety of others. To minimize risks and ensure compliance with the necessary 
requirements, management and control measures must be implemented for any 
work involving – or carried out in the proximity of – an explosives facility. The 
measures are to be applied regardless of the scope of the work - be it major, minor or 
routine – and irrespective of who is carrying it out (see Module 06.10).
This module describes the key roles and major responsibilities associated with 
explosives safety with respect to contractors, a visiting workforce, and explosives 
area support workers. It provides procedures and safety requirements for the 
control and management of such personnel, as well as the approval, monitoring 
and management of work involving – or carried out in the proximity of – explosives 
facilities.
Module 06.70
Inspection of 
explosives 
facilities
An important element of managing explosives facilities is the carrying out of 
inspections by the establishment responsible for the facilities as well as by national 
authorities with oversight responsibilities. The absence of an inspection process or 
programme to address inspection faults can lead to unplanned explosions. For this 
reason, it is critical that national authorities require their explosives establishments 
to document and track periodic inspections of explosives facilities, inspection faults 
and the status of fault corrections and repairs. In addition, national authorities 
should monitor these establishments’ processes and provide oversight to ensure 
compliance with the IATG and their own national processes.
This module explains the importance of having both a comprehensive inspection 
process and an aggressive fault correction system in place. It underscores the 
potential ramifications of being deficient in these areas. It also describes a 
recommended procedure for conducting inspections of explosives facilities, 
recommends timeframes for periodic inspections, provides a sample logbook that 
identifies areas in the explosives facility that should be inspected, and provides 
a sample format for recording inspections and faults. Users should adapt these 
as necessary for each of their explosives facilities. Lastly, this module addresses 
national authorities’ oversight responsibilities and provides a checklist format for 
them to use when inspecting their explosives establishments.
Module 06.80
Inspection of 
ammunition
Inspection of ammunition is necessary to ensure its safety, reliability and 
performance. The level of inspection and complexity of the effort depends on the 
reason for the inspection. Some are basic external inspections of ammunition or its 
packaging, while others – such as surveillance breakdown of ammunition and the 
collection of propellant or explosives samples (see Module 07.20) – are significantly 
more complex and require additional resources, training and preparation time.
This module presents general information on ammunition safety and common 
inspection points. It provides guidance for the conduct of a basic risk assessment 
prior to any explosives processing operation (see Module 02.10) ; outlines three 
types of ammunition inspections –routine, technical and safe to move – and offers 
advice on physical inspections, including for 25 generic types of ammunition.
The module is also designed to help users assign status codes and other markings to 
indicate the status of inspected ammunition : serviceable, unavailable or banned.
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IATG Volume 07 – Ammunition Processing
Module 07.10
Safety and 
risk reduction 
(ammunition 
processing 
operations)
Any operation involving ammunition potentially increases the risk of UEMS. 
Explosions can be initiated by a multitude of external stimuli, and a minor event can 
quickly escalate into a major one. As a result, full consideration must be given to 
every explosives processing operation, regardless of the level of complexity involved, 
so as to assess all potential risks.
It is difficult to control and manage risks and develop a risk reduction strategy for 
an explosives operation if potential risks are unknown. For this reason, this module 
starts with general guidance on the carrying out of a risk assessment (see Module 
02.10). Users are then systematically guided on how to translate findings into safety 
measures, namely through the establishment and implementation of user-developed 
“safe systems of work”. Such systems, guided by risk assessment results in 
conjunction with guidance and requirements from this module, should also address 
other areas that are part of the control and management of explosives facilities (see 
Module 06.10). In addition, the module provides guidance on general safety aspects 
of ammunition and explosives processing.
Module 07.20
Surveillance and 
in-service proof
Since ammunition deteriorates over time, it has a finite serviceable life. 
Surveillance and in-service proofs are used to monitor its condition and gauge 
any safety deterioration or performance degradation ; these processes also fulfill 
the ammunition inspection requirements provided in Module 06.80. An accurate 
appraisal of an ammunition item’s state and remaining lifespan is important to 
ensure both safety and cost-effectiveness. Such a determination ensures the most 
advantageous return on what can be a heavy investment.
This module explains both the rationale for, as well as the importance of, 
surveillance and in-service proof processes. In providing guidance and requirements 
that national authorities can use to develop their own processes, it serves to 
address areas such as national regulation, responsibilities, requirements for 
effective programmes, and the establishment and implementation of relevant 
processes, including the collection of baseline data, sample selection, scheduling 
and documentation. Also included is strong advice related to propellants, some of 
which can spontaneously ignite upon depletion of their stabilizer content below 
minimum levels. This depletion process is unstoppable and irreversible and has 
resulted in many catastrophic UEMS. Once stabilizer content is depleted, the only 
safe solution is immediate isolation and disposal of the ammunition. With advance 
warning through a surveillance programme, such ammunition could possibly be used 
in training before it becomes unsafe to handle or store, which would allow an owner 
to optimize its use.
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IATG Volume 08 – Transport of Ammunition
Module 08.10
Transport of 
ammunition
International agreements and regulations govern the transport of dangerous 
goods, including ammunition. Without them, and given that national transportation 
regulations vary greatly across States, the international movement of dangerous 
goods would be severely impeded, if not impossible. These international regulations 
rely on the UN hazard classification system, which is almost universally accepted by 
States and which provides a common platform for safe transport (see Module 01.50). 
All other international transport agreements and regulations build on the UN system.
This module explains how the UN system is used by organizations responsible 
for developing international regulations for the safe transport of ammunition 
and explosives by truck, rail, air and sea. It discusses each of these modes of 
transport and the international regulations and requirements that govern them. 
The ammunition-related regulations on the transport of dangerous goods in these 
international agreements apply only if a national authority has adopted them for 
internal use. States that adopt them benefit from a harmonized and safe system for 
classifying and transporting ammunition. The quantity distances in Module 02.20 are 
based on the UN hazard classification system, an IATG RRPL 3 requirement.
IATG Volume 09 – Security of Ammunition
Module 09.10
Security 
principles and 
systems
The physical security of ammunition stockpiles is an essential part of through-life 
management as it reduces the risk of loss, theft, leakage and proliferation 
(collectively referred to as “diversion”) as well as acts of malfeasance, such as 
sabotage. Physical security is especially important in regions of instability and 
post-conflict environments, where basic security steps can have a very large impact 
in terms of preventing diversion. When compared to the value of an ammunition 
stockpile, the financial costs associated with taking security precautions are minimal. 
Security costs should not be viewed simply as an expense ; they should be balanced 
against the potential costs associated with poor security leading to UEMS. Effective 
and efficient physical security of a State’s ammunition stockpile is consistent with 
IATG guiding principles (see Module 01.10). States are advised to adopt an active, 
rather than reactive, approach to accounting for and securing their ammunition (see 
Module 03.10).
This module is designed to help improve physical security standards for ammunition 
stockpiles. It establishes guiding principles for physical security, details the various 
elements of physical security, provides guidance and requirements for implementing 
these elements, defines the necessary procedures, and introduces technical security 
systems in support of the through-life management of ammunition.
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IATG Volume 10 – Ammunition Demilitarization and Destruction
Module 10.10
Demilitarization 
and destruction 
of conventional 
ammunition
A number of IATG modules note that certain stockpile management activities can 
generate unsafe, damaged or excess ammunition-related materials that may need to 
be demilitarized or destroyed. In addition, certain international treaties, agreements 
and instruments refer to or require the destruction of ammunition. States that intend 
to destroy ammunition can avail themselves of various techniques, ranging from 
relatively simple open burning and detonation, to highly sophisticated industrial 
demilitarization processes. Each of these processes requires expert knowledge and 
carries a unique set of risks. States are advised to carry out comprehensive planning to 
be able to select the most appropriate and efficient process and to execute it safely.
This module provides general guidance on and introduces a technical methodology 
for the safe planning and execution of ammunition demilitarization and destruction 
activities in support of through-life management. It does not provide a template for 
demilitarization and destruction as there are many different factors to consider ; 
instead, it focuses on core activities that are common to most destruction processes.
IATG Volume 11 – Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation
Module 11.10
Ammunition 
accidents : 
reporting and 
investigation
Reporting and investigating ammunition accidents are fundamental, preventive safety 
measures. All accidents should be immediately reported and properly investigated 
so that appropriate action can be taken. Delays in reporting and responding, or the 
failure to conduct a proper investigation, may perpetuate a dangerous situation and 
increase the likelihood of an accident.
This module introduces the overall rationale behind accident reporting and investigation. 
It presents a classification system for accidents and provides guidance on actions 
that can be taken when an accident occurs ; accident reporting procedures ; and 
the related responsibilities of the established investigation authority and assigned 
technical investigator. National authorities that wish to develop requirements for 
accident reporting and investigation can use this module as well as Module 11.20, 
which covers a specific methodology for conducting an accident investigation.
Module 11.20
Ammunition 
accidents : 
investigation 
methodology
Reporting and investigating ammunition accidents is important to ensure that causes 
are identified and appropriate actions taken to prevent a reoccurrence or UEMS. 
Conducting an investigation is never a simple matter. Accidents are not usually the 
result of a single failure, but rather result from a series of progressive and sequential 
events or failures that together eventually cause an accident. Determining the causes 
of an accident requires the application of a systematic and deliberate approach using 
a proven and agreed-upon methodology.
This module introduces and describes the basic elements of an accident investigation 
and provides a methodology for conducting one. It includes topics such as gaining 
assistance from other agencies and technical experts, gathering evidence and 
interviewing witnesses. It provides a checklist that helps to guide and track 
investigation activities. In addition, it includes lists of generic questions, divided by 
major topics - such as ammunition, personnel qualifications, and procedures - that can 
be used by an investigator.
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IATG Volume 11 – Ammunition Accidents, Reporting and Investigation
Module 11.30
Ammunition 
storage area 
explosions : EOD 
clearance
Based on the number of UEMS that occur each year around the world, it is highly 
likely that some IATG users will need to oversee post-event explosive ordnance 
disposal clearance. As these situations are extremely dangerous, cleanup is best left 
to experienced and qualified organizations. An understanding of the consequences 
of UEMS and of the particulars of post-UEMS cleanups can underscore the need to 
maintain safe and secure ammunition stockpiles.
This module explains the extreme danger associated with post-event situations, 
during which ammunition and explosives - in a variety of hazardous conditions - may 
be scattered over large areas. It details the potential consequences of such an 
event on the surrounding people and areas, as well as the hazards that have to be 
addressed. It provides basic clearance principles and guidance on the development of 
a clearance methodology and the clearance operation itself. An example of an EOD 
clearance order is provided as an annex to this module.
IATG Volume 12 – Ammunition Operational Support
Module 12.10
Ammunition on 
multi-national 
operations
This module provides guidance on the storage, handling, and use of ammunition 
and explosives for personnel deployed in multi-national operations. It provides 
basic planning guidance for selecting appropriate locations for the safe storage 
of ammunition from troop-contributing nations, details key force level explosives 
safety and risk management roles and responsibilities, and identifies the required 
competencies for a multi-national force explosives safety officer. It establishes 
the minimum safety requirements for unit personnel and the public ; specifically, it 
features a table that refers to appropriate IATG modules and paragraphs, to meet 
RRPL 1 stockpile management requirements, at a minimum. A force’s goal should be 
to strive for higher RRPLs to reduce risk.
The guidance in this module encourages all troop-contributing nations to certify that 
ammunition deployed in support of multi-national operations is “safe to deploy” and 
is subject to surveillance and in-service proof programmes that are fully compliant 
with Module 07.20.
Module 12.20
Small unit 
ammunition 
storage
Small unit organizations such as police or isolated military units - many of which 
operate in heavily populated urban areas - handle ammunition on an almost daily 
basis although they may not have received the necessary training to do so. Such a 
lack of training has led to deaths and injuries in a number of catastrophic UEMS.
This module provides guidance for individuals in small units who are responsible for 
ammunition handling, storage and management. Since many basic safe handling and 
storage requirements in the IATG are also directly applicable to small units, this module 
provides a requirements checklist that points to appropriate IATG modules and paragraphs 
to meet RRPL 1 stockpile management requirements, as a minimum. As compliance 
may be difficult to achieve, this module offers advice on the use of a risk management 
approach (see Module 02.10) and the importance of communicating risks to all potentially 
affected parties, especially when compliance with the IATG cannot be achieved. Wherever 
possible, small units should apply quantity distances (see Module 02.20).
Small units may accumulate large amounts of ammunition whose safety status is 
unknown, including as part of criminal investigations. This module includes warnings 
and guidance on isolating or disposing of such dangerous materials as quickly as 
possible, in accordance with the governing national legal framework or protocol.
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ANNEX II : PROCESS FOR PRODUCING NATIONAL STANDARDS
Implement, review and amend 
Allocate resources to achieve goals 
Real estate Equipment Funds Time People
Assign goals and milestones 
Prioritization of activities Drafting national standards SMART objectives
Establish strategy and priorities 
International
norms
Regional
obligations
Existing national
norms IATG
Decision on
national standards
Map the options and choose the most appropriate 
Understanding challenges Commitment to safeammunition management Demonstration of commitment
Initiate legislation 
Risk acceptance Safeguarding law Formalizing national authority
Understand the problem
Baseline risk assessments Analysis of environment Capabilities assessment
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ANNEX III :  PESTLE FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN NATIONAL  
AMMUNITION RISK MAPPING 
Various external factors may positively influence ammunition risks, thus creating 
opportunities ; or negatively, thus posing a threat 42). The PESTLE factors to consider 
are political, economic, socio-ethical, technological, legal and environmental :
Political factors include government regulations and legal issues such as : political 
situation, political stability, State interference, market regulations, trade agreements, 
tariffs or restrictions, tax policy and taxes, employment laws, environmental regu-
lations, lobbying and clarity of law. They define both formal and informal rules that a 
State must abide by, so they can create advantages and opportunities for both the 
State and organizations. The analyst should have the freedom to explore and present 
the positive and negative effects of political factors so that the national authority 
can consider all possible outcomes, to develop appropriate policy and strategy.
Economic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP), economic growth, interest 
rates, exchange rates, inflation rate, tax policy and level of unemployment all affect 
the State’s purchasing power and cost of capital. National interest rates and fiscal 
policy are set around economic conditions, which then influence the purchasing 
power of government and commerce as well as the structure of their expenditure. 
The analyst will take these and any other economic factors into account to inform 
the strategy.
Social forces influence our attitudes, interests and opinions, creating our behaviour 
and ultimately what is expected or acceptable within a society, e.g. societal and 
individual risks to life. In this context, societal factors can include : structure of popu-
lation, birth rates, accident rates, increase of global population, level of education, 
cultural diversity and standards and norms. Ethical factors involve duties, morality, 
integrity, behaviour, what is good and bad for the State, organizations, employees 
and society as a whole. Ultimately, the analyst uses socio-ethical factors to inform 
the strategy on how the government and the society at large view the impact of 
diversion of ammunition and accidental explosions at munitions sites.
Technological advances can change the way in which governments and organiza-
tions operate. Technological factors such as R&D activity, automation, technological 
incentives, or the rate of technological change, can remove or place barriers for 
the successful strategy outcome. They can also enhance productivity levels and 
sway outsourcing decisions, which might include the development of home-grown 
expertise and the reduction of reliance on support from international assistance 
providers. Understanding the existing and potential capacity for technological devel-
opment can inform the development of an ammunition and explosives safety and 
security strategy that is achievable and sustainable. In many States, technological 
progress has created a society which expects instant results, which can be a cause 
of friction between the affected State and well-intentioned international assistance 
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providers, if the affected State is not at the same level of technological development 
and integration. New technologies can increase the rate at which information is 
exchanged between stakeholders. A faster exchange of information can benefit 
governments and organizations as they are able to react more quickly to changes. 
The analyst should consider the absorptive capacity for innovation of the State and 
of society, to inform the strategy about if and when the State could and should 
introduce new technologies.
Legal factors are a subset of the above-mentioned political factors, which involve 
all regulatory and law determinants that can negatively or positively affect results 
of internal and external stakeholder actions and the decisions of government. The 
analyst must identify and consider these factors, such as international, regional and 
national legal restraints, regulations and guidance, independently for every activity 
relating to ammunition and explosives. These are factors which deal with legal 
complications. The analyst will need to check on new and pending legal requirements 
to ensure compliance.
Environmental factors include environmental protection legislation, pollution, waste 
management and disposal, clean air and water, wind, energy saving technologies 
and attitudes towards ecology in society. The environmental factors assess what 
kind of impact an activity is having, or might have, on the environment. The impact 
can either be negative or positive and the analyst should consider both in order 
to inform policy-makers so that they make choices relevant to their own State’s 
situation and aspirations.
National
Ammunition
Stockpile
Political
Technological
Economic
Social
Environmental
Legal
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ANNEX IV : CAPABILITY LINES OF DEVELOPMENT
The UK Ministry of Defence manages eight capability lines of development in its 
acquisition framework. Interoperability should be considered as an overarching 
theme that encompasses all lines of development. It implies the ability for an armed 
force and its branches of service, civilian contractors, service providers and relevant 
national authorities and ministries to work together in a compatible manner whilst 
performing very different roles and tasks. Interoperability extends to the interaction 
between services, defence capabilities, other government departments and the 
civil aspects of interoperability, including compatibility with civil legislation and 
standards. The capability lines of development 43) are briefly characterized below :
• Training. The provision of the means to practise, develop and validate, within 
constraints, the practical application of a common military doctrine to deliver a 
military capability. 
• Equipment. The provision of military platforms, systems and weapons (expendable 
and non-expendable, including updates to legacy systems) needed to outfit or 
equip an individual, group or organization.
• Personnel. The timely provision of sufficient, capable and motivated personnel 
to deliver defence outputs, now and in the future.
• Information. The provision of a coherent development of data, information and 
knowledge requirements for capabilities and all processes designed to gather and 
handle data, information and knowledge. Data is defined as raw facts, without 
inherent meaning, used by humans and systems. Information is defined as data 
placed in context. Knowledge is information applied to a particular situation.
• Concepts and doctrine. A concept refers to capabilities to be used to accomplish 
an activity in the future. Doctrine is an expression of the principles by which the 
military guide their actions and is a codification of how activity is conducted today.
• Organisation. Relates to the operational and non-operational organisational rela-
tionships of people. It typically includes military forces, line ministries and civilian 
organisations as well as the structure of defence contractors providing support.
• Infrastructure. The acquisition, development, management and disposal of all 
fixed, permanent buildings and structures, land, utilities and facility management 
services in support of defence capabilities. It includes estate development and 
structures that support all personnel.
• Logistics. The science of planning that takes care of the forces’ movement and 
maintenance. It encompasses activities in the design and development, acquisition, 
storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material ; 
transport of personnel ; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and 
disposition of facilities ; and furnishing of services, including medical and health 
service support.
| 76
A
tt
ac
hm
en
ts
ANNEX V : IATG RATIONALE FOR A NATIONAL SAFEGUARDING LAW
One of the most efficient means of protecting the public from the effects of an 
explosive event is by using separation distances, 44) which ensure that the general 
population and their properties are always at a tolerably safe distance from the 
explosives during storage and handling. These separation distances frequently 
extend beyond the boundary of the explosives facility. Past experience has shown 
that without a system of safeguarding the land outside the facility boundary, the 
civilian population may build dwellings or commercial installations thereby negating 
the effective separation distance. If this occurs there are only two options available 
to the ammunition storage facility : 
1)  The explosive quantity permitted for storage shall be reduced within the 
facility ; or 
2)  The increased risk to the civilian population shall be formally accepted, even 
if it is above the tolerable risk level. 
Either option is undesirable. 
The alternative options of : 
1)  Moving the civilian population from the area ; or 
2)  Moving the ammunition storage area ;
are national, political decisions. Therefore, to ensure that explosives facilities are not 
compromised by civil encroachment of private or public land development within the 
explosion danger area of the facility, a system of safeguarding should be established 
and incorporated within the laws of the State. To achieve this, a formal system of 
safeguarding 45) that permits the ammunition storage organization to influence what 
activities are permitted within the explosion danger area, should be developed and 
implemented.
Local authorities have to be made aware of the status of an ammunition storage 
area and are to ensure that the national authority is notified should any building 
or development work begin in the area marked on a safeguarding map. This map 
should be produced by the national authority and distributed to local authorities 
whose area of responsibility is affected by the storage area. This map should have 
marked on it :
• The inhabited building distance (IBD), marked with a yellow line, indicating the area 
where no inhabited buildings should be developed ;
• The vulnerable building distance (VBD), marked with a purple line, indicating the 
area where no vulnerable buildings (churches, schools, curtain wall structures, 
vital structures, etc.) should be developed ;
• The area owned by the explosives facility, marked in red.
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ANNEX VI : AVAILABLE ASSISTANCE
The latest iteration of the General Assembly resolution “Problems arising from the 
accumulation of stockpiles of ammunition in surplus”, A/RES/72/55 :
• Recognizes the urgency of addressing the security and safety risks emanating 
from ineffective stockpile management around the world ; 
• Recognizes the importance of appropriate national ammunition management 
structures and procedures, including laws and regulations, training and doctrine, 
equipment and maintenance, personnel management, and finances and infra-
structure in order to ensure sustainability in ammunition management ;
• Encourages States in a position to do so to assist interested States within a bilateral 
framework or through international or regional organizations, including through 
activities conducted under the umbrella of the SaferGuard knowledge resource 
management programme, on a voluntary and transparent basis, in elaborating 
and implementing programmes to eliminate surplus stockpiles or to improve 
stockpile management.
States seeking assistance for the development of a national normative framework 
for ammunition management have many options available, some of which are outlined 
below.
International
UN SaferGuard Programme 
Under the Quick-response Mechanism, the UN SaferGuard Programme arranges 
for ammunition management assistance, including technical assessments, training 
for personnel, technical and policy support and/or clearance activities, in accordance 
with the IATG. 46)
States wishing to engage the UN SaferGuard Programme should contact UNODA 
at : conventionalarms-unoda@un.org
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
UNMAS operates under UN legislative mandates from both the General Assembly 
and the Security Council. UNMAS is an integral component of UN peace operations 
and special political missions. UNMAS responds to specific requests from affected 
Member States, the UN Secretary-General or designated officials to assist in storage, 
inspection, transportation and stockpile destruction of ammunition.
Contact : unmasgeneva@un.org
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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 
Under the Conventional Weapons Programme, UNIDIR conducts weapons and 
ammunition management research and projects to enhance the capacity of national 
policymakers and relevant security authorities, tasked with leading or supporting 
the design and strengthening of a national framework related to the governance and 
management of weapons and ammunition. More specifically, UNIDIR endeavours 
to support States and UN partners in their efforts to establish accountable and 
transparent weapons and ammunition management policies and plans, and to help 
monitor and assess progress.
States wishing to contact UNIDIR may reach them at : unidir@un.org
Government to government
Many States are willing to provide assistance through their department for foreign 
affairs or possibly through a specific department for international development. This 
assistance might be for either humanitarian, historical relationship or commercial/
trade purposes. Such assistance can take the form of training, education, technical 
or legal advice and support, infrastructure projects, trade treaties, etc. 
Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG)
The Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) 47) is an informal grouping 
of similar-minded States seeking to exchange best practices, build capacity on 
physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), and promote knowledge 
transfer with regard to SALW and conventional ammunition, including the provision of 
advice and support in the field of disposal and destruction of SALW and conventional 
ammunition. 
States seeking assistance from MSAG should use the instructions in the publicly 
available MSAG handbook. 48)
Bilateral
Governments may have bilateral partnerships which often extend to arrangements 
for knowledge and technology transfer that can be applied to the safe and secure 
management of ammunition and explosives.
During and in the immediate aftermath of conflict, military assistance is most often 
in the form of “equip and train”, i.e. the assisting State will provide equipment to the 
requesting State as well as training with the equipment for its designed purpose. 
In well-developed bilateral relationships, it is often possible for the affected State to 
receive more advanced training and education. This type of training and education 
can be in the form of advanced courses of instruction held in the assisting State’s 
training or academic establishments. Some States also offer opportunities for short 
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or long-term attachments in technical units, which provide the “learner” from the 
assisted State with the chance to learn new skills in a practical setting. States may 
also wish to share technical expertise, advice and support.
Regional collaboration
There are many relevant inter-governmental and regional organizations which may 
offer ammunition management assistance, 49) including the United Nations Regional 
Centres for Peace and Disarmament (UNLIREC, UNREC and UNRCPD), 50) African 
Union (AU), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of 
American States (OAS), European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
Box 6 – Ammunition management cooperative approach – NATO and United States
Though the US Department of Defense has its own weapons development, research 
facilities and explosives safety programmes, because of its close relationship with 
NATO, US ammunition life cycle safety is addressed cooperatively within NATO 
Allied Committee (AC) 326, also known as the Ammunition Safety Group, and its three 
subgroups. This process and the subject matter material have expanded and evolved 
since the early 1960s and continues to this day, towards addressing life-cycle aspects : 
design, manufacture, suitability for service, hazard classification and packaging, 
surveillance, storage, transportation, and disposal. These activities are not carried out 
because of a particular accident has occurred, but to help pool ideas, experience and 
resources, assess accident and test information, and enhance capabilities towards the 
development of “best practice” in common standards and procedural guidance on 
munitions and explosives safety. These activities foster interoperability in NATO-led 
operations, promote the potential for interchangeability of ammunition, and establish 
a basis for coordinated procurement of munitions and explosives. These, in turn, have 
been integrated into US and other NATO nations’ requirements documents and are the 
basis for much of the content found in the IATG.
Author : Eric J. Deschambault. 
Source : Unpublished background paper.
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International and non-governmental organisations
States may be aware of international (IO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
that can offer assistance in specific areas of expertise. There are several IOs and 
NGOs offering expert services that are relevant to the safe and secure management 
of ammunition and explosives. They come from defence and civil backgrounds and 
possess expertise and experience that they can bring to the table. Because of this 
diversity, States wishing to engage such experts should consider the organization’s 
knowledge and practical experience specifically with the IATG, as opposed to 
knowledge on a single State’s regulation. 
In the context of safe and secure management of ammunition and explosives, the 
most obvious IOs and NGOs are those working in the fields of explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD), PSSM, and weapons and ammunition management. These are 
the IOs and NGOs that a State may do well engaging with in the early years of 
implementing its ammunition and explosives safety and security strategy.
As the strategy develops and the affected State becomes more resourceful, its own 
capabilities should take over the running of many or all of the facilities and activities. 
IOs and NGOs may then continue to provide expertise and advice on complex tasks 
such as long-term procurement strategy and planning, the sustainable demilitarization 
of surplus stocks, environmental testing and in-service surveillance of stocks of 
ammunition and explosives.
There is no single clearing house or list of IOs and NGOs but States wishing to engage 
could seek impartial advice, for example, from the UN SaferGuard Programme 51) or 
the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT). 52)
81 |
A
tt
ac
hm
en
ts
NOTES 
83 |
N
ot
es
 1) See IATG 01.30, Table 1 : Functional areas of conventional stockpile management
 2) www.un.org/disarmament/ammunition
 3) www.unece.org/ ?id=3598 
 4) www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Q-Handbooks/HB-05-LCMA/ 
SAS-HB05-LCMA.pdf 
 5) www.s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.10-Guide-to-IATG-V.2.pdf 
 6) www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/ 
unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html
 7) Kick-out is a common term for ammunition items expelled from the explosion site.
 8) Small Arms Survey Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS) database
 9) Ibid
 10) UNSMIL Libya. See www.unsmil.unmissions.org/
un-experts-assist-aftermath-brak-al-chati-ammunition-explosion
 11) NY Times. See www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/world/europe/ 
ukraine-ammunition-depot-explosion.html 
 12) Video is available at www.youtube.com/ewestnews1000 
 13) UNGA (2017), Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition 
stockpiles in surplus, UN Doc. A/RES/72/55, available at 
 www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp ?symbol=A/RES/72/55.
 14) Resolution 63/61. Adopted 2 December 2008. A/RES/63/61 of 12 January 2009
 15) www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines/ 
 16) IATG 01.40 www.s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.40-Glossary-and-Definitions-V.2.pdf 
 17) www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp ?symbol=A/RES/72/55 
 18) UNGA Resolution 72/55 “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional 
ammunition stockpiles in surplus”, 4 Dec 2017
 19) www.s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
IATG-01.30-Policy-Development-and-Advice-V.2.pdf 
 20) Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Swiss Department of Defence, 
Civil Protection and Sports (2015), Consultative Meeting on the Safe and Secure 
Management of Conventional Ammunition, Geneva (16-17 November 2015).  
Chair’s Summary; Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Swiss 
Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (2016), International Workshop 
on the Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition, Geneva (8-9 December 2016). 
Chair’s Summary.
 21) GICHD, February 2018. The State of Play in Safe and Secure Management of 
Ammunition, p. 24
 22) www.un.org/disarmament/ammunition 
 23) A PESTLE analysis is an acronym for a tool used to identify the external forces 
and factors facing an organisation. The letters stand for Political, Economic, Social, 
Technological, Legal and Environmental.
 24) Concerning risk reduction, external factors and existing capabilities
 25) www.s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.20-Index-of-Risk-Process-Levels-V.2.pdf 
 26) www.s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
IATG-01.20-Index-of-Risk-Process-Levels-V.2.pdf 
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 27) Life-cycle management of ammunition (LCMA) handbook (2018), Geneva :  
Small Arms Survey
 28) Reference : DDESB, Technical Paper 15 Approved Protective Construction, version 3. 
May 2010, Alexandria, VA
 29) Ibid
 30) www.iso.org/home.html 
 31) www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/ 
 32) www.unddr.org/iddrs
 33) www.mineactionstandards.org
 34) See www.iso.org/standards-catalogue/browse-by-ics.html
 35) IATG 01.10, Section 6 - www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines/ 
 36) 02.10 - Introduction to risk management principles and processes -  
www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines/ 
 37) www.smallarmssurvey.org/ ?uems 
 38) www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines/ 
 39) www.defence.gov.au/publications/DefenceCapabilityDevelopmentHandbook2012.pdf 
 40) www.s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
IATG-01.90-Personnel-Competences-V.2-rev.pdf 
 41) The table is adapted from Annex 1 of ‘A Practical Guide to Life-cycle Management of 
Ammunition’ published by the Small Arms Survey. 
 42) See, for example Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development 
UK, www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/strategy/organisational-development/
pestle-analysis-factsheet
 43) www.trak-community.org/index.php/wiki/Defence_Line_of_Development 
 44) IATG 02.20 Quantity and separation distances
 45) IATG 02.40 Safeguarding of explosive facilities
 46) www.s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/documents/factsheets/ 
Ammunition-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
 47) www.msag.es/ 
 48) www.msag.es/images/general/menuimagenes/handbook/ 
2013_MSAG%20HANDBOOK%20as%20of%2006.2013.pdf 
 49) www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_intergovernmental_organizations 
 50) www.un.org/disarmament/disarmsec/regional-centers
 51) www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/ 
 52) www.gichd.org/ 
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